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Abstract
This thesis collects three interrelated chapters of empirical work, which are connected 
to each other in the sense of testing UK fiscal policy. The first chapter investigates 
whether the UK fiscal policy was consistent with an intertemporal budget constraint for 
a long period of time from 1955 to 2006. I find evidence of sustainability with three 
structural breaks, respectively occurring in the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. 
UK fiscal policy has been sustainable throughout the sample period except from 1973- 
1981 when a non-Ricardian regime applied. For the remaining periods correction of fiscal 
disequilibrium occurs through adjustments in public revenue rather than expenditure. 
Finally, I find evidence of non-linear fiscal adjustment, with UK authorities not reacting 
to relatively small deficits; but correcting exceedingly large deficits and any temporary 
surpluses relatively fast. The second chapter investigates whether the Fiscal Theory of the 
Price Level can deliver a reasonable explanation for UK inflation in the 1970s, a period in 
which the government greatly increased public spending without raising taxes and money 
growth was entirely endogenous. The implied model of inflation is tested in two ways: for 
its trend using cointegration analysis and for its dynamics using the method of indirect 
inference. I find that it is not rejected. I also find that the model’s errors indicate omitted 
dynamics which merit further research. Finally, when the model is extended to the data 
for the output gap and interest rates it is rejected for these further two variables. With 
a normalised Mahalanobis Distance of 5.1 overall and 3.3 for the data variances, this 
rejection is not so catastrophic that some re-specification could not possibly repair the 
model. But, perhaps not surprisingly, it indicates that the rather simple set-up of the 
model, while well able to capture the wide fluctuations of inflation in this unusual policy 
environment, cannot capture the behaviour of output and interest rates.
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Introduction
The Greek crisis has reminded the world of the importance of budget sustainability. 
For the UK, too, with an annual budget deficit close to Greek levels, the risk of bankruptcy 
cannot be easily ignored. While the recent large cut in government budget expenses has 
eased most fears of its bankruptcy there is still concern that its public debt may not be 
sustainable. In this thesis I focus on the historical behaviour of UK fiscal policy, check for 
its sustainability over different periods, and examine one particular episode, the 1970s, in 
some detail where sustainability appears to have been lacking.
The first chapter of this thesis tests for fiscal policy sustainability in the UK for the pe­
riod 1955-2006. I address a number of issues in testing the intertemporal budget constraint. 
First, I model the long-run relationship between government revenue and expenditure using 
cointegrating test by identifying the structural shifts endogenously where the break dates 
are specified by the standard Chi Square statistics. Second, I consider each regime sepa­
rately and compute Error Correction Models to see how budget disequilibrium is restored 
viz, government spending and/or taxes adjustment. Finally, the recent studies of govern­
ment IBC show increasing evidence of non-linear fiscal adjustment. I test for non-linearity 
and provide estimates of dynamic non-linear ECM of fiscal adjustment. In short, I find 
evidence of multiple structural breaks in the path of public finances and UK fiscal pol­
icy is sustainable over the time period examined. However, the results are different across 
regimes.
1
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In particular, I find a non-Ricardian fiscal policy regime for UK 1970s, where fiscal 
disequilibrium was restored by neither government expenditure nor taxes. Under such 
a regime, with monetary policy accommodative, inflation must adjust to ensure that the 
intertemporal budget constraint on fiscal policy is satisfied - the Fiscal Theory of the Price 
Level (FTPL). The aim of the second chapter is to investigate empirically whether the FTPL 
can deliver a reasonable explanation for UK inflation in the 1970s.
The policy environment of the 1970s appears to satisfy the FTPL’s requirements. UK 
government attempted to control inflation using statutory wage and price controls. They 
therefore thought that no money supply rule was required to pin down inflation and the 
Bank of England (which was not independent at this time) would simply have been told to 
set money supply equal to the demand for money by consumers, thus making money supply 
endogenous. Any inflation rate would be consistent with such monetary policies, so that it 
was not pinned down by monetary policy in such a regime. At the same time, fiscal policies 
to reduce unemployment were pursued, so that fiscal policy was not influenced the usual 
Ricardian concern to balance tax and spending. Therefore, in order for the government’s 
budget constraint to be satisfied under these conditions, inflation must adjust and this was 
what pins down inflation, basically inflation jumps to whatever level is needed to satisfy 
the government budget constraint.
The FTPL implies a relationship between the trend in the level of inflation and trends 
in fiscal variables. This relationship can be tested by cointegration analysis in a familiar 
way. Indirect inference, less familiarly, can be used to evaluate the model’s dynamics by 
checking whether its simulated dynamic behaviour is consistent with the data. The data
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under indirect inference is described by some time-series equation. The model’s simulated 
behaviour implies a range of time-series behaviour depending on the shocks hitting it; this 
range can be described by the parameters of the same time-series equation that fits the data. 
I can derive the implied statistical joint distribution for the parameters of this equation and 
test whether the parameters of the time-series equation from the data lie jointly within this 
distribution at some confidence level.
In the third chapter I have extended the empirical tests of the model for the 1970s 
episode to the data for the output gap and interest rates. In the FTPL framework, inflation 
is determined by the fiscal conditions as above. Output and interest rates are determined 
by inflation interacting with the IS curve and the Phillips curve. The model is solved 
recursively and tested by the method of indirect inference. What I find is that while the 
model was not rejected for inflation, which is recursively prior determined, it is rejected for 
these other two variables.
The plan of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter I assess whether UK pub­
lic finances were sustainable for the period 1955-2006. In the second chapter I investigate 
empirically whether the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) can deliver a good ex­
planation for UK inflation in the 1970s where the period monetary policy loses control on 
inflation. In the third chapter, I extend the model to the data for the output gap and interest 
rates and test it against the data. Finally, I draw the overall conclusions.
Chapter 1 
UK Fiscal Policy Sustainability, 1955-2006
1.1 Introduction
In recent months fiscal policy sustainability has returned to the forefront of policy debate. 
This follows the significant increase in many countries’ public debt caused by the eco­
nomic downturn following the global credit crunch and government-sponsored banking 
rescue plans. A country’s fiscal policy is sustainable when its intertemporal government 
budget constraint is met, implying that the stock of outstanding public debt is offset by ex­
pected future primary surpluses. Sustainable fiscal policy excludes the possibility of ponzi 
games where the government systematically services the cost of existing debt exclusively 
by issuing new one. Investors’ willingness to hold the government’s outstanding bonds de­
pends on the latter’s perceived ability to generate future surpluses by reducing excessive 
spending and/or increasing public revenue. Doubts regarding this ability will cause the 
government difficulties in marketing its debt (Quintos, 1995) and, after a critical thresh­
old is surpassed, lead to a non-Ricardian, fiscal-dominance regime where the IBC is met 
through higher inflation rate reducing the real value of outstanding bonds, as suggested by 
the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (see e.g. Leeper (1991), Woodford (1996, 1998a and 
1998b)).
A country whose public finances have been hit particularly hard by the global finan­
cial crisis is the UK. In 2009, the UK deficit to GDP ratio reached the level of 11.5%,
4
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the highest among G7 members. This significant worsening of the UK’s fiscal outlook, 
and continuing concerns regarding the UK’s banking system fragile state, have raised con­
cerns about the sustainability of the UK’s triple A credit rating, causing a lively debate on 
the optimal extend and speed of fiscal adjustment. Existing studies suggest that the UK 
has a sound record in correcting fiscal imbalances, both historically (see e.g. Ahmed and 
Rogers, 1995) as well in recent years (see Considine and Gallagher, 2008). Given the in­
creased current focus on fiscal policy, empirical evidence regarding the sustainability of 
UK budget finances is timelier than ever.
In this chapter I revisit the question of UK fiscal policy sustainability from 1955 to 
the year preceding the onset of the fiscal downturn, 2006. Compared to existing studies, my 
analysis provides four distinct features. First, I test for fiscal policy sustainability account­
ing for structural shifts in UK fiscal policy, identified using tests for endogenous structural 
breaks. Second, I assess the sustainability of UK fiscal policy for each of the endogenously 
identified fiscal regimes. Third, I test whether deviations from the path of sustainable fis­
cal dynamics are corrected through adjustments in government revenue and/or expenditure. 
Finally, I test for non-linear adjustment in UK fiscal policy taking into account the endoge­
nously structural shifts.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: First, the UK fiscal policy has been 
sustainable over the period under examination. Second, it has been subject to three struc­
tural breaks, respectively located in the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. These 
dates coincide with important shifts in UK fiscal policy, with the first break moving gov­
ernment finances away from sustainability and the remaining two towards it. Third, fis-
1.1 Introduction 6
cal policy was sustainable during all fiscal regimes, except from 1973-1981 when a non- 
Ricardian regime applied. Fourth, correction of deviations from fiscal sustainability has 
been taking place through adjustment of public revenue rather than expenditure. Finally, I 
find evidence of non-linearities in UK fiscal policy, with the UK government not reacting to 
relatively small deficit values; but correcting exceedingly large deficits and any temporary 
surpluses relatively fast.
Overall, my findings confirm the status of the UK government as a historically sound 
sovereign borrower; and suggest a fundamentally sound UK fiscal position at the eve of the 
credit crunch crisis. Given, however, the depth of the ensuing banking crisis and worsening 
of the UK’s fiscal outlook, this does not leave any room for fiscal complacency. Having said 
so, the findings suggest is that in the coming years of fiscal consolidation UK authorities 
will more likely than not enjoy the markets’ confidence in their historical ability to restore 
sustainability, even in the face of large fiscal shocks such as the present one. Within the 
current environment of increased risk aversion, and as the EMU sovereign debt crisis has 
amply demonstrated, such market credibility will be a significant advantage at the disposal 
of UK authorities striving to maintain sustainable fiscal dynamics.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: section 1.2 discusses the theoretical 
model of government IBC; section 1.3 reviews the relevant literature on testing government 
sustainability constraint; section 1.4 discusses the data; section 1.5 lists out the linear test on 
government budget sustainability; section 1.6 presents the results on linear error correction 
model; section 1.7 analyses the issue of non-linear fiscal adjustment; section 1.8 concludes.
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1.2 Analytical framework
The government’s budget constraint can be written as (Hakkio and Rush, 1991)
bt — (1 +  rt)bt- 1  +  Gt — Rt ( 1 . 1)
where, bt denotes the real stock of government outstanding public debt, rt denotes the real 
interest rate, Gt denotes the real government expenditure net of interest and R t is the real 
tax revenues (all variables are expressed in real term).
Since equation (1.1) holds for every period, taking expectation of it and solving for 
government real debt bt recursively yields
T  —  t + l
( R t ~  Gt)
LI ^ + ri+j)n + 'T~l uTT bTi i (1 + r^ ( 1.2)
Assuming constant interest rates equation (1.2) can be simplified as
bx^ ~ ? A  +
T = t + 1 (1 + r )
r —t _(l +  r ) T - t
(1.3)
which implies that the present-value government budget constraint is given by
T  =  t  +  1
(1 + r) T  — t T  —>oo (1 +  r)T~l
(1.4)
Equation (1.4) is the standard intertemporal government budget constraint. It states 
that the real public outstanding stock of debt bt must be financed by its primary surpluses.
The transversality condition (lim^. =  0 implies the government solvency
condition) must be satisfied at all times. This rules out ponzi games, i.e. the possibility 
of bubble financing of government expenditure. If the transversality condition holds, the
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present-value budget constraint of the government can be rewritten as
(R t -  Gr)
(1 + ry - i
T  =  t + 1
Equation (1.5) indicates that the necessary and sufficient condition for fiscal policy to 
be sustainable is the real interest rate to be lower than the growth rate of public debt, given 
by the deficit. If the real growth rate is larger than the real interest rate, the transversality 
condition is sufficient, but not necessary, for fiscal policy to be sustainable (Domar 1944).
1.3 Related literature
Existing studies on fiscal policy sustainability mainly address three questions. The first, 
and main one, is whether fiscal policy is sustainable or not. The second is whether fiscal 
policy involves structural breaks. Finally, the third is whether fiscal adjustment involves 
non-linearities. A basic concept in this literature is the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint (IBC), given by equation (1.4) above.
The empirical analysis on whether fiscal policy of government is sustainable can 
be grouped into two categories. The first applies unit root tests on government deficit 
and/or discounted debt series. Unit roots are interpreted as evidence of unsustainable fiscal 
dynamics. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) assume a constant real interest rate and test the 
following relationship
^  = A 0 = 0 (1.6)
against alternative
lim
T  —+00
lim
T  —>oo
[(1 +  r):
L(i +  O r
— An > 0 (1.7)
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If one substitutes equation (1.7) into (1.4) leads to
T
b‘= E  ifr4.~w) +4>(1 + r)‘ (L8)rtZl (1+r)
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) argue that a sufficient condition for the validity of the 
IBC is the stationarity of the primary deficit, i.e. A 0 =  0 in equation (1.8). Their empirical 
findings reject the hypothesis of unit root in US real deficit and real stock of debt. On this 
basis, they conclude that the U.S. fiscal policy satisfied the IBC over the period from 1960- 
1984. Trehan and Walsh (1988) argue that the only necessary and sufficient condition for 
the IBC to be met is for the deficit series inclusive of interest payments to be statinonary. 
They conclude that US public finances were sustainable over the period 1890-1986. Kre- 
mers (1989) applies unit root tests on government debt-to-GNP and interest-to-GNP ratios. 
He finds US fiscal policy to be sustainable for most of the inter- and post-war period but 
not for the period after 1981. Wilcox (1989) introduces stochastic real interest rates. He 
argues that the IBC may be satisfied even if the level of the primary debt is non-stationary; 
and the sufficient condition for sustainability is for the discounted value of public debt to 
converge to zero. Using this criterion, he finds US fiscal policy to be unsustainable for the 
post-1974 period.1
The second category applies tests for cointegration between public deficit and debt 
or, more frequently, government expenditure and government revenue. Haug (1991) tests
1 Other studies adopting this approach include Feve and Henin (2000) and Uctum and Wickens (2000). 
Feve and Henin (2000) use semi-annual data and test for fiscal policy sustainability for G7 countries, con­
cluding that a unit root cannot be rejected for Germany, France, Italy and Canada. Uctum and Wickens (2000) 
use annual data over the period 1965-1994 testing for fiscal sustainability in the US and eleven EU countries. 
They conclude that only Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and France were on a sustainable fiscal path.
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for cointegration between real government debt and real surplus using quarterly US data 
over the period 1960-1986. He finds evidence of cointegration suggesting sustainable US 
fiscal policy. MacDonald (1992) provides a similar analysis for the period 1951-1984. Us­
ing monthly data, he reaches the opposite conclusion. On the other hand, Hakkio and Rush 
(1991) test for cointegration between US real per capita government revenue and expendi­
ture using quarterly data for the period 1950 to 1988. They focus directly on government 
expenditures and revenues where they rewrite equation (1.4) in term of total expenditure
where T G t denotes the real total government spending on goods and services, transfer 
payments, and the interest on the debt. Gt denotes the real government expenditure net of 
interest and R t is the real tax revenues. If both R t and Gt are assumed to be 1(1) processes, 
then AR t and A Gt are stationary. If both R t and Gt follow random walks with drift
T
TG t — rtbt- i  + Gt — Rt + 'y ^
T — t
Rt — <21 + R t- 1  + £\t ( 1.10)
Gt — <2 2 + Gt- 1 + £21 ( 1. 11)
In this case, equation (1.9) can be rewritten as
( 1.12)
where,
T
T — t
and £t — (^r-) (£it — £21) ■
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Assuming the limit term in equation (1.12) goes to zero then the hypothesis of public 
debt sustainability can be written as
Rt — & +  (3TGt +  St (1.13)
Hakkio and Rush (1991) assume stochastic real interest rates and argue that for fiscal 
policy to be sustainable public revenue and expenditure should be cointegrated with (3 = 1. 
Using the entire sample period, they find these conditions to be met. However, they find US 
fiscal policy not to be sustainable following 1964, with evidence of non-cointegration being 
particularly strong during the period 1976-1988. Using the same cointegration methodol­
ogy, Ahmed and Rogers (1995) conclude that UK fiscal policy is sustainable over the pe­
riod spanning over two centuries. Corsetti and Roubini (1991) provide a similar analysis 
for selected EMU countries finding that their government finances do not satisfy the IBC.2
Tests of fiscal policy sustainability based on cointegration tests are subject to biased 
inference in case the underlying cointegrating relationship is subject to structural breaks. 
Hakkio and Rush (1991), MacDonald (1992) and Haug (1995) address structural insta­
bility by choosing the break dates exogenously. By contrast, Quintos (1995) uses tests 
determining the break dates endogenously. She also introduces the concepts of strong- and 
weak-form fiscal policy sustainability. Her definitions encompass and extend previous de­
finitions. In view of the generality of her approach I adopt it for my own econometric 
investigation below. Strong-form sustainability is equivalent to the sustainability definition 
used by Hamilton and Flavin’s (1986) and Hakkio and Rush (1991). Under weak-form
2 Other studies using a cointegration framework to test the validity o f the IBC in Europe include Bravo and 
Silvestre (2002) and Afonso and Rault (2010) for eleven and fifteen EU countries respectively. Both studies 
reach mixed results with regards to the validity o f the IBC in their sample countries.
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sustainability the limit term in equation (1.4) converges to zero but at rate lower compared 
to the strong-form sustainability case. Furthermore, under weak-form sustainability the 
limit term in equation (1.4) converges to zero faster when government revenue and expen­
diture are cointegrated rather than when they are not. Weak form sustainability implies 
that the deficit and undiscounted debt series may be mildly explosive, in which case an un­
predictable shock may put public finances into an unsustainable path. As a result, under 
weak-form sustainability the government may face difficulties marketing its debt and be 
obliged to pay higher interest rates to service it. In terms of equation (1.13) fiscal policy is 
weak-form sustainable if 0 < (5 < 1, irrespective of whether R t and TG t are cointegrated 
or not; weak-form sustainable if (3 = 1 and R t and TG t are non-cointegrated; strong form 
sustainable if (3 = 1 and R t and TG t are cointegrated; and non-sustainable if (3 = 0.
To see these, Quintos (1995) rewrites the equation (1.4) in first differenced
=  £  (f f i _ - A .Gr) +  Um
^ (l +  r )T_t T—i-oo
T = t + 1 V '
A b n
_(l +  r) T - t (1.14)
For equation (1.14) to converge to a stable solution operating as a binding fiscal constraint, 
the last term should convergence to zero, i.e.
A b n
lim
t —>oo [(1 +  r) T - t = 0 (1.15)
Assume the interest rates are constant at r, under the condition that A bT is stationary, the 
evolution of the limit term in (1.15) behaves like
Et lim e~kT
L T-
=  0 (1.16)
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where k is a constant. If Ab j  is non-stationary, then equation (1-15) behaves like the 
following process
Quintos shows that the stationarity of AbT is the sufficient condition for the term in 
(1.15) to go to zero. In addition, if government revenue is not cointegrated with government 
expenditure then the term in (1.16) goes to zero faster than that in (1.17), where (1.16) and 
(1.17) is the ’strong’ and ’weak’ condition for deficit sustainability respectively.
Quintos’ (1995) tests of fiscal policy sustainability are based on equation (1.18) be­
low
Quintos shows that if 0 < /3 < 1 then A bt is 1(1) regardless of whether s t is stationary 
or not. Hence, the necessary and sufficient conditions for Abt to be stationary are (3 =  1 
and et is stationary. Quintos applies her methodology to US quarterly data covering the 
period 1947-1992. She concludes that the US fiscal policy is weakly sustainable despite a 
negative structural break in the early 1980s causing non-cointegration after 1980.
Arghyrou and Luintel (2007) use Quintos’s methodology to test for fiscal policy sus­
tainability in four heavily indebted EMU countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy and the 
Netherlands. They find that the introduction of the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 has caused a 
structural break towards sustainability; and that fiscal policy at the eve of the Euro’s intro­
duction in 1999 was strong-form sustainable in Ireland and weak-form sustainable in the 
rest of their sample countries. Finally, they find evidence of non-linear fiscal adjustment 
for their sample countries, which is consistent with the findings of Bohn (1998), Cipollini
Et lim e ' kTV f  = 0 (1.17)
A bt — (1 — j3)TGt — ol — St ( 1.18)
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(2001), Samo (2001), Arestis et al (2004), Bajo-Rubio et al (2004, 2006), Chortareas et al 
(2008), Considine and Gallagher (2008) and Cipollini et al (2009). These studies model the 
dynamics of the discounted public debt series or the cointegrating vector between public 
revenue and expenditure in a number of different countries using variants of threshold au­
toregressive (TAR) models. The intuition underlying these non-linear models is that fiscal 
adjustment takes place more rapidly when budget deficits or the stock of outstanding debt 
exceed certain critical thresholds beyond which they are considered exceedingly large.
1.4 Data
For the econometric investigation I use data for UK total managed public expenditure in­
clusive of interest payments on outstanding public debt and total public revenue excluding 
seignorage. The data source is the UK Office of National Statistic (ONS) data bank. The 
data frequency is quarterly and covers the period 1955Q1-2006Q1. I calculate real gov­
ernment revenue R t and real government expenditure TG t deflating nominal series by the 
GDP deflator. Figure 1.1 plots the de-seasonalised data in log real terms.3 Table 1.1 reports 
unit root tests on the series’ log-levels and first differences. Both series are integrated of 
order one and show a similar upward trend. However, there appears to be significant diver­
gence during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, indicating increasing deficits over those periods 
and structural breaks in any cointegrating relationship that may link the two series. Both
3 The original data series include strong seasonal effects which I account for using a constant and three 
seasonal dummies.
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Fig. 1.1. Real government revenue and expenditure (both in log terms)
the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (1979, 1981) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (1988) tests 
confirm that government revenue and expenditure are first difference stationary - Table 1.1.
Unit root tests T G t R t
Levels 1st. Diff. Levels 1st. Diff.
ADF test statistic -1.744 -5.643 -1.086 -6.755
(0.408) (0.000)** (0.722) (0.000)**
PP test statistic -1.274 -16.490 -0.848 -18.261
(0.642) (0.000)** (0.803) (0.000)**
Table 1.1. Tests for non-stationarity of deseasonalised real government expenditure TG and 
revenue R
Notes on Table: M acKinnon’s critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) fo r  rejection o f  
hypothesis o f  a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while ** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. The number o f  lags in the AD F tests is set using A IC  criterion; fo r  the PP  
tests usingNewey-West bandwidth (see Newey and West, 1987).
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1.4.1 The issue of levels versus logs
According to Quintos (1995), in a regression of revenue on expenditure expressed in levels, 
if a  =  0 and (3 — 1 and et is stationary then I have strong form sustainability; if a  =  0 and 
(3 — 1 and et is non-stationary then I have weak form sustainability.If the equation is tested 
using the logs of the variables, these conditions continue to hold. However, some of the 
other conditions describing weak-form sustainability in a regression estimated using levels 
change. More specifically:
Suppose that the regression in levels is 
Rt — c>i +  (3TGt +  £t
The condition for strong-form sustainability is that a  = 0, [3 =1 and et is stationary. 
If this is the case, then the equilibrium relationship between R t and T G t is given by an 
(1, -1) cointegrating vector. In other words R t =  (3TGt +  et ,where et is a random error 
term with zero mean. In that case, I can claim that the equilibrium relationship in levels is 
R t = T G t-If this is the true long-run (cointegrating) relationship, then I can claim that in 
equilibrium log R t =  log TG t, in which case I can also claim that a regression of the form 
log R t =  a  +  (3 log TG t 3- et is a test of strong form sustainability:
- If a  = 0 and (3 = 1, and et is stationary, then log R t =  log TG t, i.e. R t =  T G t and I 
have strong-form sustainability
- I f  a = 0 and (3=T, but et is not non-stationary, then I am in the case of R t =  T G t but 
without cointegration, in which cases I have weak-form sustainability. In short, the condi­
tions for strong form sustainability are the same, irrespective of whether the cointegrating 
relationship is estimated using levels or logs.
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However, when the cointegrating regression is estimated in terms of logs, the condi­
tions for weak form sustainability defined in terms of the value of (5 when the regression is 
estimated using levels do not hold any more. Suppose that I have weak form sustainabil­
ity with a  =  0 and (3 less than 1, say (3=0.90 In that case, the true relationship in levels is 
given by:
Rt = 0.90 TG t
Now, taking logs, this will give the following equation 
log Rt = log(0.90) +  log
In other words, if I transform the level relation into logs, once again I will get a unity 
coefficient on log T G t and, this time, a non-zero constant.
To conclude, when the cointegrating equation is estimated using logs, the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for weak form sustainability are: 
a = 0 and (3 = 1, and et is stationary.
By contrast, I have weak form sustainability if a  =  0, f3 = 1 and et is not stationary; 
or if (3 = 1 but a  is not zero, irrespective of whether et is stationary or not.
1.5 Linear tests on fiscal policy sustainability
I start the econometric investigation on the sustainability of UK fiscal policy using the lin­
ear cointegration framework. I first test for sustainability without accounting for structural 
breaks in the cointegrating equation given by (1.13). Dynamic OLS (DOLS) methodol­
ogy is used; it is a cointegration method that is asymptotically equivalent to the Engle and 
Granger (1987) and Johansen (1988) cointegration methodologies with the extra advan­
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tages of performing better in small samples and controlling for endogeneity among the 
regression’s variables through the inclusion of lead and lag differences of the regressors 
(see Stock and Watson, 1993). Given that both series include one unit root, the DOLS 
regression is given by equation (1.19) below
k
R t =  ct +  (3TGt -f j kA T G t~k +  £t (1-19)
t=—k
where A denotes the first difference operator and et is a random error term. If the resid­
ual series et is serially correlated, then equation (1.13) is estimated using the Dynamic 
Generalised Least Squares (DGLS) estimator. This augments equation (1.19) with autore­
gressive error terms under the Feasible Generalised Least Squares. Under both DOLS and 
DGLS the cointegrating vector is given by C V  =  R t — a  — (3TGt. The results o f estimat­
ing equation (1.13) using DGLS are reported in Table 1.2 below. Although the restriction 
(3 = 1 is not rejected, strong-from sustainability is rejected as the reported ADF test is not 
significant at the 5% level.
Cointegration analysis without breaks
DGLS
1955Q1-2006Q1
Estimated equation
Rt  =  ex. 4- (3TGt +  £t
a 0.044(0.128)
P 0.984(0.020)**
F-Wald test, Ho : (5 =  0 [p-value] 2443.31 [0.000]**
F-Wald test, H q : f3 =  1 [p-value] 0.609[0.435]
t-ADF test on e t -2.693
5% critical value [-4.250]
S.E.of regression 0.055
Table 1.2. Cointegrating test for real government revenue and expenditure without breaks
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Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. * *  indicates significance at the 
1% level. All DGLS estimates are corrected fo r  heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation o f  
unknown form  in the residuals (DOLS-HAC, see Newey and West, 1987).
Rejection of cointegration, however, may be due to structural breaks in the cointegrat­
ing relationship given by (1.13). To identify such breaks endogenously I use the sequential 
cointegration stability test proposed by Quintos (1995) described by equations (1.20) to
( 1 .2 2 ) below:
Rt — & +  (3TGt 4- 5(DtTG t) 4- St ( 1 .2 0 )
where,
Dt = 1 if* € Ti =  { l,...,m }  ( 1 .2 1 )
Dt = Gi f t  e  T2 = { m + 1 ,...,T }  (1.22)
In equations (1.21) and (1.22) D t is a dummy variable taking the value of unity be­
fore period m  and zero thereafter, where m  represents the date of the tested breakpoint. 
The null hypothesis of stability assumes 5 = 0 and is tested using a Wald F-test. Equa­
tion (1.20) is estimated sequentially. Following Andrews (1993) I have trimmed 15 per 
cent from the beginning and the end of the sample. Equation (1.20) is estimated using 
DOLS and, for robustness, OLS. Figure 1.2 plots the sequential Wald test statistics testing 
the restriction <5=0 over the period of 1963Q1-1998Q4. It suggests that the cointegrat­
ing relationship between R t and T G t has been subject to multiple structural breaks. More 
specifically, it suggests a number of statistically significant values for the depicted Wald 
statistics in the early 1970s, the early 1980s and the second half of the 1990s. As structural
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breaks cannot fall too close together, these three groupings of statistically significant values 
are very likely reflecting three distinct structural breaks. I define the exact timing of each 
of the three breaks on the basis of highest F-score in each grouping. Using this criterion, 
both estimators suggest breaks of almost identical timing, with DOLS suggesting the break 
points to be 1972Q3, 1981Q3 and 1997Q4, while OLS suggests 1972Q1, 1981Q4 and 
1997Q3. These dates can be related to important exogenous shifts in UK macroeconomic 
policy. The break in 1972 is close to the introduction of UK expansionary fiscal policies 
targeting the unemployment rate through wage and income controls. The break in 1981 
coincides with the introduction of the fiscal consolidation effort pursued by the Medium 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), a monetary and fiscal policy programme announced by 
the Conservative Government in early 1980. Finally, the break date in 1997 is close to the 
endorsement of the then newly-elected Labour government of its predecessor’s relatively 
restrictive fiscal policies and the granting of operational independence to the Bank of Eng­
land, establishing further the ’monetary-dominance’ rather than ’fiscal-dominance’ nature 
of the UK macroeconomic outlook.
The next step is to test for UK fiscal policy sustainability accounting for the effect of 
the structural breaks identified above. I do so by estimating equation (1.23) below
3
Rt = a  + (3TGt +  y ]  ^ (D u T G t) +  s t (1-23)
i —  1
Equation (1.23) modifies the cointegrating regression given by equation (1.13) by in­
cluding slope dummy variables corresponding to each of the three breaks identified above. 
Each of the three dummies Dit (j = 1 ,2 ,3) takes a zero value before the date of the 
corresponding break and the value of unity thereafter (see Table 1.3). A positive (nega-
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Fig. 1.2. Sequential Wald tests for structural breaks
five) coefficient represents a movement towards (away from) sustainability. The augmented 
cointegrating vector obtained by equation (1.23) is then given by
3
C V  = R t — a — pT G t -  Y ,  M D itT G t)  (1.24)
1
Equation (1.23) is estimated using three alternative methodologies, namely DGLS, 
DOLS and simple OLS. The break dates for the DGLS/DOLS and OLS estimates of equa­
tion (1.23) are respectively defined on the basis of the highest score obtained from the 
DOLS and OLS estimator for each grouping of statistically significant F-statistics in Figure 
1.2. The only exception is the break of the early 1970s when equation (1.23) is estimated 
using the DGLS methodology. By defining D \t to take the value of unity after 1972Q3 I 
could not obtain DGLS estimates free of heteroskedasticity problems and obtained a mar­
ginally insignificant, at the 5% level, dummy coefficient. Experimenting with alternative
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definitions of D \t in the neighbourhood of 1972Q3 I obtained the best data representation 
(in terms of a minimum score for the Akaike information criterion and regression standard 
error) when D \t took the value of unity from 1973Q3 onwards.
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 1.3. The coefficients of all break 
dummies turn out to be statistically significant at the 5% level with the expected signs. 
More specifically, the coefficient of the dummy capturing the break of the early 1970s is in 
all cases negatively suggesting a deteriorating fiscal outlook during the implementation of 
the fiscal expansion of that period. The positive and significant coefficients of the dummies 
capturing the break of the early 1980s confirm the partial reversal of the expansionary 
dynamics established in the early 1970s. Finally, the dummy variables capturing the break 
of 1997 have a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting further improvement of the 
UK’s public finances over the period 1998-2006.
Finally, I use the findings reported in Table 1.3 to test for weak and strong-form sus­
tainability. Similar to the findings reported in Table 1.2, the DGLS, DOLS and OLS results 
reported in Table 1.3 suggest there is no cointegration between government revenue and 
expenditure at the 5% level. As the DGLS model produces a significantly lower regres­
sion standard error, it seems to provide the best data representation. I then test the null 
hypothesis of a unity total multiplier for the coefficient of public expenditure, given by
k
H0 : (5 +  Qj — l>f°r j  = 1,2,3. For the DGLS and DOLS estimates the null of a unity
j=i
total multiplier is maintained. However, given the finding of no cointegration in my pref- 
ered DGLS estimation of equation (1.23) the findings reported in Table 1.3 suggests that
1.5 Linear tests on fiscal policy sustainability
following the structural breaks that occurred in the early 1970s, 1980s and late 1990s, 
the period 1955-2006 UK fiscal policy was sustainable only in the weak-form sense.
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Cointegration analysis with breaks
Estimated equation
R t — ol +  (3TGt +  (f)l D i T G t +  (P2D 2T G t  +  4>$DfTGt +  Et
DGLS DOLS OLS
a 0.014(0.253) 0.161(0.165) 0.323(0.154)*
P 0.997(0.042)** 0.968(0.027)** 0.939(0.025)**
cpfD i =  1 in 1972Q1-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) - - -0.006(0.003)*
4>fDi  =  1 in 1972Q3-2006Q1 0 Otherwise) - -0.008(0.003)** -
i 1(D 1 =  1 in 1973Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) -0.015(0.004)** - -
4>2(D 2 =  1 in 1981Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) 
(D 2 =  1 in 1981Q4-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise)
0.007(0.003)* 0.005(0.002)**
0.007(0.002)**
0 3(D 3 =  1 in 1997Q3-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) - - 0.009(0.002)**
0 3(£>3 =  1 in 1997Q4-2006Q1, 0 Otherwise) 0.013(0.005)** 0 .010(0 .002)**
F-Wald test, H 0 : f5 +  <j)1 +  0 2 +  0 3 =  1 [p-value] 0.001[0.981] 1.040[0.309] 5.193[0.024]*
F-Wald test, H i : (3 +  <j>l +  0 2 +  0 3 =  0 [p-value] 741.71 [0.000]** 1688.07[0.000]** 1844.40[0.000]**
t-ADF test on f t -2.880 -2.837 -2.851
5% critical value [-4.250] [-4.250] [-4.250]
S.E.of regression 0.021 0.047 0.050
Table 1.3. Cointegration test for real government revenue and expenditure with endogenous 
structural breaks
Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. * , * *  indicate significance at the 
5% and 1% level, respectively. A ll DGLS estimates are corrected fo r  heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation o f  unknown form  in the residuals (DOLS-HAC, see Newey and West, 
1987).
1.6 Linear error correction models
In the previous section I concluded that the post-war UK fiscal policy has been subject to 
three structural breaks, giving rise to four fiscal regimes over the sample period respectively 
covering the periods 1955-1972; 1973-1981; 1982-1997 and 1998-2006. In this section I 
estimate linear error correction models (ECM) for each of these periods with a dual ob­
jective. First, to establish whether fiscal policy reacts to fiscal disequilibrium as the latter
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is captured by the cointegrating vector accounting for structural breaks. If for a particular 
period the disequilibrium term enters the ECM with an insignificant coefficient or a sig­
nificant coefficient of positive sign, then the fiscal regime of that period is identified as 
’non-Ricardian’, characterised by non-sustainable fiscal policy. Second, if fiscal policy re­
acts to deviations from the long-run equilibrium path, estimates of ECMs will provide an 
information as to whether the adjustment comes through the revenue or expenditure side, 
or both. Then government revenue and expenditure may be considered to be generated by 
error-correction models of the form
k k
A R t =  a  +  R t~k +  li^-T G t-k  +  d£t-i +  Vt (1-25)
i —  1 i =  1
k k
ATG t — a  +  ^2/ P i^R t-k  +  l i ^ T G t- k  +  Set-i +  vt (1.26)
i —1 i = l
where, et_i is the estimated cointegrating vector, obtained from the DGLS estimation of 
equation (1.23) accounting for structural break and vt is a random error. There are two 
single error correction models. Both (5s are expected to capture the adjustments of AR t and 
ATG t towards long-run equilibrium, while A R t-k  and A TG t~k are expected to capture 
the short-run dynamics of the model.
The results of the ECM estimations are reported in Table 1.4. The Table presents 
ECM models estimated for the whole of the sample period as well as for each of the four 
sub-periods defined by structural breaks identified in section 1.5 above. For each sample 
period I present two ECMs, ECM1 and ECM2, respectively defining the dependent vari­
able to be A R t and ATG t. I report parsimonious estimates (i.e. excluding insignificant 
terms) obtained from initial models including four lags (i.e. k = 4) of A R t and AT G t.
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The cointegrating vector which is calculated using R t — a — (3TGt is defined as govern­
ment surplus as it is normalized on government revenue. Hence, in ECM1, which models 
the adjustment of government revenue, a reduction in the value of the error correction term 
below zero giving rise to a deficit must be accompanied by an increase in government rev­
enue to create a surplus and eliminate the disequilibrium caused by the deficit. In a similar 
fashion, if the error correction term takes positive values, giving rise to a surplus, govern­
ment revenue may be allowed to decline until the disequilibrium term becomes zero and a 
balanced budget is restored. In other words, S should take negative in the ECM1. On the 
other hand, ECM2 models the adjustment of government expenditure. If the disequilibrium 
term increases to take positive values, so that the public budget is in surplus, the govern­
ment can afford to increase expenditure until the disequilibrium term becomes zero and a 
balanced budget is restored. By contrast, if the error correction term declines below zero, 
so that the public budget is in deficit, government expenditure must also decline to restore 
a balanced budget. In other words, in the case of ECM2 5 should take a positive sign. For 
the full-sample period and three out of four sub-periods, the coefficient of the error correc­
tion term S is statistically significant with a negative sign in the equation modeling A R t 
and however being insignificant in the equation modeling ATG t. These findings suggest 
a Ricardian regime, consistent with fiscal policy sustainability and adjustment to any fiscal 
disequilibrium coming from the revenue rather than expenditure side. This is an indication 
of UK authorities relying more on tax increases rather than expenditure reductions to cor­
rect fiscal imbalances. On the other hand, the period 1973Q3-1981Q2 seems exceptional. 
For that period, the 5 coefficient is insignificant in both ECM equations, suggesting lack
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of policy reaction to the increasing at the time fiscal disequilibrium term. This is consis­
tent with the findings in the previous section, suggesting a structural shift away from fiscal 
sustainability in the early 1970s and the presence of a ’non-Ricardian’ fiscal regime.
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ECMl 1955Q1-2006Q1 1955Q1 -1973Q2 1973Q3-1981Q2 1981Q3-1997Q3 1997Q4-2006Q1
5 -0.131(0.031)** -0.258(0.050)** -0.249(0.170) -0.095(0.042)* -0.110(0.049)*
a 0.005(0.002)** - - 0.006(0.003)* -
-0.291(0.065)** - -0.488(0.141)** -0.290(0.109)** -
h - - - - -
@3 0.164(0.062)** - - - -
h - - - - -
7 i -0.191(0.091)* -0.329(0.137)* - - -
72 - - - - -
73 - - 0.414(0.183)* -0.349(0.173)* -
74 - - -0.341(0.173)* -
S.E.of regression 0.022 0.021 0.027 0.021 0.020
Misspe. tests (p-values)
F -A R 0.91 0.68 1.00 0.29 0.18
F - A R C H 0.12 0.88 0.27 0.77 0.80
Norm 0.40 0.23 0.84 0.30 0.91
F-Het 0.44 0.16 0.07 0.72 0.21
ECM2 1955Q1-2006Q1 1955Q 1-1973Q2 1973Q3-1981Q2 1981Q3-1997Q3 1997Q4-2006Q1
-0.040(0.023) -0.035(0.051) 0.141(0.121) -0.003(0.030) -0.033(0.037)
s 0.007(0.001)** 0.010(0.003)** - 0.004(0.002)* 0.014(0.003)**
h - - - - -
- -0.215(0.088)* - - -0.258(0.109)*
@3 - - -0.291(0.132)* - -
h - - - - -
7 i -0.219(0.066)** - - - -0.486(0.153)**
72 - - 0.376(0.171)* - -
7 s - - 0.376(0.179)* - -
74 - - - - -
S.E.of regression 0.017 0.018 0.026 0.015 0.011
Misspe. tests (p-values) -
F -A R 0.57 0.76 0.10 0.45 0.99
F - A R C H 0.10 0.81 0.38 0.44 0.28
Norm 0.32 0.75 0.61 0.20 0.46
F-Het 0.77 0.40 0.06 0.49 0.54
Table 1.4. Error correction models for short run dynamic behaviours
Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. *  * *  indicate significance at the 
5% and 1% level, respectively. Some estimations include impulse dummy variables fo r  out­
lier observations. These are: fo r  period 1955Q1-2006Q1, 1962Q4 in ECM (l) and 1974Q1 
and 1974Q3 in ECM(2); fo r  period 1955Q1-1973Q2, 1962Q4 in ECM(l). The estimates 
fo r  period 1973Q3-1981Q2 are correctedfor heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation o f  un-
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known form  in the residuals (OLS-HAC estimates). F-AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test 
fo r  residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -A R C H  is an F-test fo r  autoregres­
sive conditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is the normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test fo r  
residuals ’ non-normality. F-H et is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity.
1.7 Non-linear fiscal adjustment
The empirical findings reported above suggest that over the last five decades UK fiscal pol­
icy has been subject to multiple structural shifts, giving rise to multiple fiscal regimes and 
one of which (in the 1970s) was non-Ricardian. Overall, however, I find that UK gov­
ernment finances over the period of 1955-2006 satisfy the IBC. This implies that that the
UK’s authorities ultimately correct fiscal disequilibrium, even after protracted negative fis­
cal shocks. An important question is whether the process of reversion to fiscal equilibrium 
involves non-linearities, i.e. whether fiscal adjustment occurs only when fiscal imbalances 
become sufficiently large. To test this hypothesis, I need to estimate econometric models 
able to capture such non-linearities.
The smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model for a univariate time series, yt is 
given by (van Dijk, 2002)
Vt = (0i,o +  0i,i2/t-i> +••• +  0i,P2/t-p) (1 — G (st', 7, c))
+  (0 2 ,o +  0 2 ,i2/t-i> +••• +  0 2 ,Pyt-p) G (st\ 7 , c) +  et
for t =  1 ,..., T,
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or
yt = 4\Xt (1 -  G (st ; 7 , c)) +  0 2 x tG (st ; 7 , c) +  st
where x t =  ( l , ^ )  with ^  =  (^_ i, and 0 * =  (0 i)O, 0 M, +... +  0 ijP) , i =  1 , 2 .
The residual term et is assumed to be a martingale difference sequence with re­
spect to the history of the time series up to time t — 1 , which is denoted as £lt - 1  =  
{y t-u y t- 2 , ...2/i_(p_i), 2/i-p}, that is, £  [et |ftt_i] =  a 2.
The transition function G (s*; 7 , c) is a continuous function that is bounded between 
0 and 1. The transition variable st can be either a lagged endogenous variable, or an en­
dogenous variable or a (possible nonlinear) function of lagged endogenous variables (see 
Lin and Terasvirta, 1994). There are two interpretations of the STAR model. On the one 
hand, the STAR model can be considered as a regime-switching model that allows for two 
regimes, associated with the extreme values of the transition function, G (st; 7 , c) =  0 and 
G (st; 7 , c) =  1 , where the transition from one regime to the other is smooth. On the other 
hand, the STAR model allows for a ’continuum’ of regimes, where the transition function 
G (st; 7 , c) each time has a different value between 0  and 1 .
The adjustment towards this equilibrium is nonlinear and can be characterized as 
regime-switching, with the regimes determined by the size and/or sign of the deviation 
from equilibrium. In linear time series, this type of behaviour is captured by cointegration 
and error-correction models (ECMs). For the nonlinear behaviour I concentrate on incor­
porating the smooth transition mechanism in an ECM to allow for nonlinear or asymmetric 
adjustment. The regime that occurs at time t is determined by the observable variable st and 
the associated value of G (st ; 7 , c ) . Different choices for the transition function G (st ; 7 , c)
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give rise to different types of regime-switching behaviour. One of the choice for G (s4; 7 , c) 
is the first-order logistic function
G (st; 7 , c) =  (1 4- exp { — 7  (st — c) } ) - 1  7 > 0  (1.27)
with the resultant model is called the Logistic STAR (LSTAR) model. The parameter c in 
(1.27) can be interpreted as the critical threshold distinguishing between the two regimes 
(i.e. the inner and the outer regimes), in the sense that the logistic function changes 
monotonically from 0 to 1 as st increases and G (st;'y,c) =  0.5. The parameter 7  de­
termines the smoothness of the change in the value of the logistic function and, thus, the 
smoothness of the transition from one regime to the other. In the LSTAR model, the two 
regimes are associated with small and large values of the transition variable st (relative to 
c).
The other possible choice for G (st; 7 , c) can be the second-order logistic function
G (s t-,'y,c) = (1 +  e x p { - 7 (st -  a )  (st -  c2 ) } ) _ 1  7 > 0  (1.28)
where c =  (ci,c2) '. In this case, the two regimes are associated with small and large values 
of the transition variable st . The resultant model is called the Quadratic-Logistic STAR 
(QL-STAR) model. The specification is identical to that of the L-STAR model except the 
outer regimes are defined by two threshold values, the upper (c2) and the lower (cQ which 
define a band, where the speed of adjustment to equilibrium within the band is different 
from the one prevailing outside the band.
In order to choose the correct transition function the type of non-linear adjustment 
needs to be identified. The hypothesis of linear fiscal policy can be tested using the testing
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procedure established by Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Terasvirta (1994). This is 
based on the auxiliary regression given by equation (1.29) below
4>
£ t =  7oo +  X /  +  h j £ t - j £ t - d  +  72 j £ t - j £,f - d  +  73 j £ t - j ^ - d )  + h £ t - d  +  l b £ t - d  +  UJt
(1.29)
In (1.29) et denotes the estimated fiscal disequilibrium term accounting for structural 
breaks given by the estimated residuals obtained from the DGLS estimation of equation
(1.23); (f) is the order of the autoregressive parameter determined by the partial autocorrela­
tion function of et (see Granger and Terasvirta(1993)); d is the delay parameter of the tran­
sition function; and u t is an the error term with Gaussian distribution. The null hypothesis 
of linearity is described by H0 : 7 ^  =  7 2j =  j 3j =  7 4 =  =  0, for all j  £ (1,2, ...0).
This is tested using a general L M - type test, denoted by L M G, estimated for all plausible 
values of d. If any of the L M G statistics is statistically significant the linearity hypothesis 
is rejected. If more than one L M °  statistics are significant the value of d is determined by 
the highest F-score. If linearity is rejected I determine the specific form of non-linearity 
following the approach by Terasvirta and Anderson (1992). In terms of equation (1.29) 
this involves three steps. First, conditional upon L M G being significant, I test the null de­
scribed by H0 : 7 3j =  7 5  =  0, for all j  G (1,2, ...eft). This test is denoted as L M L1. If 
L M L1 is significant I conclude that non-linearity is of the logistic form. If L M L1 is not 
significant I test the null of H 0 : 7 ^  =  7 2  • =  7 4  =  0|73j- =  7 5  =  0, for all j  e  (1,2, ...(f)). 
I denote this test as L M Q. If L M Q is significant I conclude that non-linearity is quadratic. 
If both L M L1 and L M Q are insignificant I perform a third test, L M L2, where the null is
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given by H 0 : 7 y  =  0|'y2j- =  7 3j =  7 4 =  7 5 =  0, for all j  G (1,2, ...0). A statistically 
significant L M 12 indicates linearity of the logistic type.
Given the relatively small number of observations in each o f the fiscal regimes iden­
tified in the previous section I test for non-linear fiscal adjustment using the whole of the 
available sample period. Figure 1.3 presents the partial autocorrelation function of the se­
ries obtained from estimating equation (1.23) with DGLS, i.e. the DGLS estimates of the 
cointegrating vector accounting for structural breaks. This is statistically significant up to 
the second lag, therefore equation (1.29) is estimated by setting <f> =  2.
The results of the non-linearity tests are reported in Table 1.5.1 report findings for d = 
1, 2, 3 and 4. The significance of L M G score for d= 1 suggesting a rejection of the hypothe­
sis of linear fiscal adjustment. For d= 1 the L M L1 and L M Q are insignificant and significant 
respectively. Therefore, I conclude the existence of non-linearity of quadratic type. This
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implies the existence of two fiscal regimes, defined by an upper and lower critical deficit 
threshold value. Deficit values within the critical thresholds belong to the inner regime, in­
terpreted as normal deficit values. Deficit values below the lower critical threshold denote 
an exceedingly large fiscal deficit, calling for more aggressive correction. Finally, deficit 
values above the upper critical threshold denote an exceptionally small deficit value, or a 
surplus, which the authorities may use as a cushion allowing a fast increase in spending 
and/or reduction in taxation, bringing the deficit back into its normal range.
0  =  2
d L M G L M Ll L M Q L M L2
1 7.523[0.000]** 1.717 [0 .182] 13.775[0.000]** N/A
2 0.989[0.434] 1.321 [0.269] 1.073[0.362] 0.064[0.801]
3 1.151 [0.335] 2 .115[0 .124] 1.057[0.350] 0.265[0.767]
4 0.522[0.791] 1.130[0.325] 0.277[0.759] 0.161 [0.852]
Table 1.5. Test for the type of non-linear fiscal adjustment
Note on Table: p-value are in square brackets and  * *  represents significance at 1% 
level. Recall that L M G is a general test o f  non-linearity where the null hypothesis is de­
noted as linear adjustment. L M L1 tests the linear adjustment against the alternative o f  
non-linear logistic adjustment; LM ®  tests the null o f  linear adjustment against the alter­
native o f  non-linear quadratic adjustment; L M L2 tests the quadratic adjustment against 
the alternative o f  logistic adjustment.
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The quadratic non-linearity is modeled using the Quadratic-Logistic Smooth Thresh­
old Error Correction Model (QL-STECM). This is given by equations (1.30) to (1.33)below
A R t =  0tS\t +  (1 — &t)S2t +  Vt (1.30)
71 p
Sit = Qi +  P ijA R t- j  +  'yliA T G t-j +  SiEt-i (1-31)
2—1 2—0
n p
S2t = 7 2 iA T 6 ft-j +  ^2 ^ - 1  (1-32)
1 0
et =  =  - — L — —  ci.33)
Equations (1.31) and (1.32) are standard linear error-correction models, capturing the 
two fiscal regimes, the inner (Si)  and the outer (5 2 ). Within the inner regime adjustment 
towards equilibrium takes place at a speed described by 5\. At the outer regime, adjustment 
takes place at a rate equal to £2. My expectation is that |J 2  | > |^i | denoting faster adjustment 
in the outer rather than the inner regime. Equation (1.30) models period-to-period fiscal 
adjustment as a weighted average of Si and 5 2. The regime weight 6t is defined in (1.33) as 
the probability that the transition variable takes values within the inner regime bound­
aries, with a denoting the speed of transition between these two regimes. Note that only 
A R t is being considered in the nonlinear setup as the linear ECM results suggest that the 
coefficient of the error correction term S is statistically insignificant in the equation model­
ing A T G t. As argued by the nonlinear literature, fiscal adjustment takes place more rapidly 
when budget deficits or the stock of outstanding debt exceed certain critical thresholds be­
yond which they are considered exceedingly large. As a result, if there is no adjustment in 
the linear fashion (i.e. 6 being insignificant in ECM2) I would expect the error correction 
term to be insignificant in the nonlinear framework.
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The estimates of the parsimonious QL-STECM model are reported in Table 1.6. The 
estimated coefficient of the error correction term in the inner regime (Si) is insignificant, 
suggesting no correction o f deficits within the inner regime. By contrast, the coefficient of 
the error correction term in the outer regime (S 2 ) is significant, with both critical thresh­
olds t u  and t l  being negative and significant. These suggest correction of excessive large 
deficits. They also suggest that U K  governments correct (push back into the inner regime) 
any temporary small deficits and surpluses.4 The QL-STECM has good econometric prop­
erties, as it passes all misspecification tests. It also fits the data better than its linear counter­
part reported in the first column o f  Table 1.4, as suggested by its lower regression standard 
error.
4 These findings are consistent with those reported by Considine and Gallagher (2008), who base their 
analysis on non-linearities indentified for the UK debt to GDP ratio series.
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S i S 2
Constant 0.028(0.012)* -0 .001(0 .002)
A  T G t - 0.440(0.097)**
A R t - i -0.336(0.139)*
A  l i t - 5 - 0.204(0.077)**
£t~ i 0.564(0.361) -0.122(0.029)**
a 768.64(929.9)
TU -0.012(0.003)**
t l -0.053(0.003)**
S.E .of regression 0.021
Misspecification tests (p-values)
F - A R 0.42
F - A R C H 0.21
Norm 0.55
F-H et 0.73
Table 1.6. Non-linear fiscal adjustment model (QL-STECM)
Notes on Table: standard errors in parentheses. *,** denote significance at 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. Misspecification tests are carried out. F-AR is the Lagrange 
Multiplier F-test for residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -A R C  H  is an F-testfor 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque 
test fo r  residuals’ non-normality. F-Het is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity. The 
model includes dummy variables fo r  outlier observations (1962Q4 and 1973Q2).
Figure 1.4 plots the transition function 0 {st \ <r, r) , i.e. the probability of a regime 
change in the current period against the transition variable et- u  the value of fiscal dise­
quilibrium in the previous period. I would intuitively expect 9 (et \ cr, r) to increase as the 
fiscal outlook deteriorates beyond the lower deficit threshold, calling for a fast correction 
of deficits; or increases above the upper deficit threshold, providing the government the op­
portunity to introduce higher expenditure or reduce taxation. In both cases I would expect 
a high value of 9 (et ; cr, r )  capturing a high probability of a transition from the outer regime
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to the inner. By contrast, when the fiscal disequilibrium term takes values within the inner 
regime, I would expect a low value for 6 {et \ a , r ) , denoting a low probability of switch­
ing from the inner regime to the outer. Figure 1.4 provides evidence consistent with my 
expectations. As expected, the probability of regime change is lowest when the transition 
variable takes the value of -0.026 which lies comfortably within the inner regime defined 
by [-0.053, -0.012]. On the other hand, the probability of a switch from the outer to the in­
ner regime convergences to unity fast as the lagged disequilibrium term moves away from 
the model’s estimated critical thresholds.
Finally, Figure 1.5 depicts the estimated 9t parameter over the sample period and 
its smoothed two-year moving average value. The value of 9t denotes the probability of 
being in the inner regime, i.e. expectations of being in the regime of ’normal’, and by
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implication sustainable, deficit values. From that point of view it can be seen as a rough 
measure of credibility of the current fiscal policy stance providing an indication regarding 
expectations of its sustainability. It is observed that that this probability is declining rapidly 
since the early 1970s, when the UK fiscal deficit had entered a period of non-sustainable 
fiscal dynamics as discussed in section 1.6 above. By contrast, the second half of the 
1980s saw a significant increase in the value of 0t , suggesting increasing confidence in the 
sustainability of the improved fiscal outlook achieved by the UK authorities initiated over 
that decade. Expectations of being in the inner regime record another marked reduction 
during the recession of the early 1990s, recovering however within a short period of time 
coinciding with the high growth rates the UK economy registered following its exit from the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992. Finally, there is another sharp decline in the value of 
9t in the late 1990s. Most likely, however, this is not the result o f a substantial deterioration 
of the UK fiscal outlook but a substantial improvement, leading to expectations that the 
surpluses the UK economy had been recording over those years (see Figure 1.1) would 
not last for long. Indeed, and as Figure 1.1 suggests, in the subsequent decade of the 
2000s public expenditure increased much faster than revenue expectations, eliminating the 
temporary surpluses achieved in the late 1990s pushing back the deficit within its ’normal’ 
range and, as Figure 1.5 suggests, increasing the probability that the latter will stay there.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter I test for fiscal policy sustainability in the UK over the period 1955-2006. 
Using quarterly data and a unified framework of analysis I address four interrelated ques-
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tions. First, I test for fiscal policy sustainability accounting for exogenous shifts in UK 
fiscal policy, which I identify using tests for endogenous structural breaks. Second, I assess 
the nature of fiscal policy (Ricardian versus non-Ricardian) in each of the fiscal regimes 
identified by the structural stability analysis. Third, I test whether deviations from fiscal 
sustainability are corrected through adjustments in government revenue or expenditure. Fi­
nally, I test for non-linearities in UK fiscal policy.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: First, UK fiscal policy has been 
sustainable over the period under examination. Second, it has been subject to three struc­
tural breaks, respectively located in the early 1970s, early 1980s and late 1990s. These 
coincide with important shifts in UK fiscal policy, with the first break moving government 
finances away from sustainability and the remaining two towards it. Third, fiscal policy was
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sustainable during all sub-periods identified by the analysis, with the exception of 1973- 
1981 when the UK fiscal regime was non-Ricardian. Fourth, correction of deviations from 
fiscal sustainability has been taking place through adjustment of public revenue rather than 
expenditure. Finally, I find evidence of non-linearities in UK fiscal policy, with the UK 
government not reacting to relatively small deficit values; but correcting exceedingly large 
deficits relatively fast. The findings also imply fast correction of exceedingly small deficits 
or temporary surpluses, which can be interpreted as evidence that UK authorities use un­
usually favourable fiscal conditions as a cushion allowing a fast increase in spending and/or 
reduction in taxation.
Overall, the results show weak-form sustainability, a sufficient condition in itself to 
establish that the government finances satisfy the IBC. Since UK authorities continue to 
carry out the deficit reduction plans and the economy is characterised by a low real rate 
of interest, it is rather unlikely that the rejection of strong-form sustainability will lead to 
infinite per-capita debt in the long-run.
Chapter 2 
Can the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level 
explain UK inflation in the 1970s?
2.1 Introduction
In previous chapter I find a non-Ricardian fiscal policy regime for UK 1970s, where fiscal 
disequilibrium was restored by neither government expenditure nor taxes. Now I turn to 
this episode, the 1970s, in some detail where sustainability have been questioned.
In 1972 the UK government floated the pound while pursuing highly expansionary 
fiscal policies whose aim was to reduce rising unemployment. To control inflation the 
government introduced statutory wage and price controls. Monetary policy was given no 
targets for either the money supply or inflation; interest rates were held at rates that would 
accommodate growth and falling unemployment. Since wage and price controls would in­
evitably break down faced with the inflationary effects of such policies, this period appears 
to fit rather well with the policy requirements of the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level: fis­
cal policy appears to have been non-Ricardian (not limited by concerns with solvency) and 
monetary policy accommodative to inflation - in the language of Leeper (1991) fiscal pol­
icy was ’active’ and monetary policy was ’passive’. Furthermore, there was no reason to 
believe that this policy regime would come to an end: both Conservative and Labour parties 
won elections in the 1970s and both pursued essentially the same policies. While Margaret 
Thatcher won the Conservative leadership in 1975 and also the election in 1979, during
42
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the period it was not assumed that the monetarist policies she advocated would ever occur, 
since they were opposed by the two other parties, by a powerful group in her own party, as 
well as by the senior civil service. Only after her election and her actual implementation 
of them was this a reasonable assumption. So it appears that in the period 1972-79 there 
was a prevailing policy regime which was expected to continue. These are key assump­
tions about the policy environment; besides this narrative background I also check them 
empirically below.
Under FTPL the price level or inflation is determined by the need to impose fiscal 
solvency; thus it is set at the value necessary for the government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint to hold at the market value of outstanding debt. Given this determinate price 
level, money supply growth, interest rates and output are determined recursively as the 
values required by the rest of the model to permit this price level. The theory implies a 
relationship between the trend in the level of inflation and trends in fiscal variables. This 
relationship can be tested by cointegration analysis in a familiar way. Indirect inference, 
less familiarly, can be used to evaluate the model’s dynamics by checking whether its sim­
ulated dynamic behaviour is consistent with the data. The data under indirect inference is 
described by some time-series equation. The model’s simulated behaviour implies a range 
of time-series behaviour depending on the shocks hitting it; this range can be described by 
the parameters of the same time-series equation that fits the data. I can derive the implied 
statistical joint distribution for the parameters of this equation and test whether the para­
meters of the time-series equation from the data lie jointly within this distribution at some 
confidence level.
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The FTPL has been set out and developed in Leeper (1991), Sims (1994, 1997), 
Woodford (1996, 1998a, 1998b and 2001), and Cochrane (2000, 2001) - see also com­
ments by McCallum (2001,2003), Buiter (1999, 2002), and for surveys Kocherlakota and 
Phelan (1999), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2000) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000). Em­
pirical tests have been proposed by Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), Bohn (1998), 
Cochrane (1999) and Woodford (1999), Davig et al (2007). In particular Loyo (2000) ar­
gues that Brazilian policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s was non-Ricardian and that the 
FTPL provides a persuasive explanation for Brazil’s high inflation during that time. The 
work of Tanner and Ramos (2003) also finds evidence of fiscal dominance for the case of 
Brazil for some important periods. Cochrane (1999, 2000) argues that the FTPL with a sta­
tistically exogenous surplus process explains the dynamics of U.S. inflation in the 1970s. 
This appears to be similar to what I see in the UK during the 1970s.
With fiscal policy of this type, the financial markets - forced to price the resulting 
supplies of government bonds - will take a view about future inflation and set interest rates 
and bond prices accordingly. It will set bond prices so that the government’s solvency 
is assured ex post (i.e. in equilibrium); thus it will be ensuring that buyers of the bonds 
are paying a fair price. Future inflation is expected because if the bonds were priced at 
excessive value then consumers would have wealth to spend, in that their bonds would be 
worth more than their future tax liabilities; this would generate excess demand which would 
drive up inflation. However this mechanism would only come into play out of equilibrium. 
It is unobservable because markets anticipate it and so drive interest rates and expected 
inflation up in advance; inflation follows because of the standard Phillips Curve mechanism
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by which workers and firms raise inflation in line with expected inflation. Thus the FTPL 
can be regarded as a particular policy regime within a sequence of different policy regimes.
The aim in this chapter is to test the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) as ap­
plied to the UK in the 1970s episode that described above. Buiter (1999, 2002) argue that 
the government’s IBC is a constraint on the government’s instruments that must be satisfied 
for all values of the economy-wide endogenous variables. It is an identity not just an equi­
librium condition. The economy would not be correctly specified if the government IBC 
failed to hold in all actual price sequences. It is an ill-posed equilibrium model because of 
the unwarranted change in the assumption about when the government constraint applied. 
As argued by Buiter (1999), FTPL no longer requires that the government solvency con­
straint hold for all sequences of price levels and interest rates. Instead it requires only the 
solvency constraint hold in equilibrium, that is, for equilibrium sequences of prices and 
other endogenous variables. In addition, there is an arbitrary restriction on the permissible 
configuration of the exogenous public spending and revenue sequences and the predeter­
mined initial stock of non-monetary nominal debt. This relaxation violates the normal rules 
for constructing a well-posed general equilibrium model. However, as argued by Cochrane 
(1999, 2001), this does not imply that FTPL does not hold; I observe an equilibrium se­
quence of prices where IBC holds but this can come from an FTPL economy or one with 
the traditionally assumed active monetary and passive fiscal policy.
McCallum (2001, 2003) establish a simple closed economy model and argue that 
under FTPL the solution is not leamable because the price level solution involves a bubble 
component. The traditional or monetarist representation can by contrast be learnt - see
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also McCallum and Nelson (2005). Yet they fail to notice that FTPL creates a world that 
is observationally equivalent, as noted by Cochrane (see also Christiano and Fitzgerald, 
2000); the price solution is determined by the fiscal policy and in this case the bubble 
components are eliminated. Specifically, there is no bubble in my model solution. As 
for ’leamability’ this appears to be an irrelevant consideration since fiscal and monetary 
policies are often announced via numerous policy statements; certainly they can be so 
announced, thus bypassing learning. For further discussions of the criticism of the FTPL 
please refer to section 2.10.1
Cochrane (1998, 2000, and 2001) has noted that there is a basic identification prob­
lem affecting the FTPL: in the FTPL fiscal policy is exogenous and forces inflation to close 
the government constraint while monetary policy is endogenous and responds to that given 
inflation; but the same economic behaviour can be consistent with an exogenous monetary 
policy determining inflation in the normal way, with Ricardian fiscal policy endogenously 
responding to the government budget constraint to ensure solvency given that inflation path. 
Hence testing either or both models is not straightforward. My procedure is in two stages. 
In the first stage I identify which model set-up is operating with tests of exogeneity for 
the two policy regimes: I test for and do not reject, both the endogeneity of monetary pol­
icy and the exogeneity of fiscal policy. In the second stage I go on to test whether the 
FTPL can account for the behaviour of inflation in terms of the behaviour of fiscal vari­
ables alone; I do so first by testing for the trend cointegrating relationship and secondly 
carrying out a test for the dynamic relationship. The trend relationship is tested using En­
gle and Granger (1987) cointegration analysis. Indirect inference, less familiarly, is used
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to evaluate the model’s dynamic by checking whether its simulated dynamic behaviour is 
consistent with the data. In general the Indirect Inference test has substantial test power 
against a DSGE model. This would apply to the last chapter when I use a DSGE model 
to explain the processes of inflation, output gap and interest rates (see Le et al, 2011 for 
Monte Carlo experiments on the power of indirect inference in testing DSGE models).
In the context of testing a single variable, i.e. ARMA as here, I find in Monte Carlo 
experiments that the power of the Indirect Inference test is low when the model is just a 
single equation as here. However, the ordinary single parameter test on the autoregressive 
coefficient of the error term of this equation has its usual power. This turns out to be suffi­
cient to reject the model if that parameter is nonzero. The basic point, which is discussed 
in the last part of Chapter 2, is that the error term in the model inflation equation is auto­
correlated, whereas it should be white noise. Thus while the model does not reject a role 
for government spending and taxation in the creation of inflation, in that inflation is coin­
tegrated with them and is also a nonstationary process with them as determinants, it does 
reject the notion that this is the only determinant of inflation: there is something else going 
on, that makes inflation a more persistent unit root process.
This chapter is organised as follows. I review the history of UK policy during the 
1970s in section 2.2 - in this section I establish a narrative that in my view plainly supports 
the exogeneity features required for the FTPL to be identified. A comprehensive literature 
review is appended as an appendix to the chapter (section 2.10) ; In section 2.3 I set up 
the model of FTPL for this UK episode. In section 2.4 I discuss the data and test the two 
key policy exogeneity/endogeneity assumptions of the theory econometrically. In section
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2.5 I carry out the cointegration test for the inflation trend. In section 2.6 I explain the 
methodology of indirect inference. In section 2.7 I carry out the tests for the dynamics of 
inflation. In section 2.81 discuss what evidence the model throws on other dynamic factors 
affecting inflation that are included via the model’s error term. Section 2.9 concludes.
2.2 UK policy background
From WWII until its breakdown in 1970 the Bretton Woods system governed the UK ex­
change rate and hence its monetary policy. While exchange controls gave some moderate 
freedom to manage interest rates away from foreign rates without the policy being over­
whelmed by capital movements, such freedom was mainly only for the short term; the 
setting of interest rates was dominated in the longer term by the need to control the bal­
ance of payments sufficiently to hold the sterling exchange rate. Pegging the exchange 
rate implied that the price level was also pegged to the foreign price level. Through this 
mechanism monetary policy ensured price level determinacy. Fiscal policy was therefore 
disciplined by the inability to shift the price level from this trajectory and also by the con­
sequent fixing of the home interest rate to the foreign level. While this discipline could in 
principle be overthrown by fiscal policy forcing a series of devaluations, the evidence sug­
gests that this did not happen; there were just two devaluations during the whole post-war 
period up to 1970, in 1949 and 1967. On both occasions a Labour government viewed the 
devaluation as a one-off change permitting a brief period of monetary and fiscal ease, to be 
followed by a return to the previous regime.
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However, after the collapse of Bretton Woods, the UK moved in a series of steps to 
a floating exchange rate. Initially sterling was fixed to continental currencies through a 
European exchange rate system known as ’the snake in the tunnel’, designed to hold rates 
within a general range (the tunnel) and if possible even closer (the snake). Sterling proved 
difficult to keep within these ranges, and was in practice kept within a range against the 
dollar and an ’effective’ (currency basket) rate. Finally it was formally floated in June 
1972.
UK monetary policy was not given a new nominal target to replace the exchange 
rate. Instead the Conservative government o f Edward Heath assigned the determination of 
inflation to wage and price controls. A statutory ’incomes policy’ was introduced in late 
1972. After the 1974 election the incoming Labour government set up a ’voluntary incomes 
policy’, buttressed by food subsidies and cuts in indirect tax rates. Fiscal policy was expan­
sionary until 1975 and monetary policy was accommodative, with interest rates kept low to 
encourage falling unemployment. In 1976 the Labour government invited the IMF to sta­
bilise the falling sterling exchange rate; the IMF terms included the setting of targets for 
Domestic Credit Expansion. These were largely met by a form of control on deposits (the 
’corset’) which forced banks to reduce deposits in favour of other forms o f liability. But by 
1978 these restraints had effectively been abandoned and prices and incomes controls rein­
stated in the context of a pre-election fiscal and monetary expansion - see Minford (1993), 
Nelson (2003), Nelson and Nikolov (2003), DiCecio and Nelson (2007), and Meenagh et 
al (2009b) for further discussions of the UK policy environment for this and other post-war 
UK periods.
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The description of policy suggests that the role of nominal anchor for inflation will 
have been played during the 1970s by fiscal policy, if only because monetary policy was 
not given this task and was purely accommodative. Thus the FTPL can be regarded as a 
particular policy regime within a sequence of different policy regimes. One could therefore 
think of money supply as endogenously determined by whatever demand for money would 
emerge at acceptably low unemployment and at whatever the rate of inflation was at the 
time. Hence plainly monetary policy would not define an inflation equilibrium and fiscal 
policy plays a key role. This is now I turn to.
2.3 The FTPL model for the UK in the 1970s
I assume that the UK finances its deficit by issuing nominal perpetuities, each paying one 
pound per period and whose present value is therefore where R t is the long-term rate 
of interest. I use perpetuities here rather than the usual one-period bond because of the 
preponderance of long-term bonds in the UK debt issue: the average maturity of UK debt 
at this time was approximately ten years. All bonds at this time were nominal (indexed 
bonds were not issued until 1981).
The government budget constraint can then be written as
+ M t+1 = Gt - T t + B t + ^  + M t (2.34)
where Gt is government spending in money terms, Tt is government taxation in 
money terms, B t is the number o f perpetuities issued. Note that when perpetuities are
assumed the debt interest in period t  is B t while the stock of debt at the start of period t has
2.3 The FTPL model for the UK in the 1970s 51
the value during the period of end-period debt therefore has the value ^ ~ . M t is the 
beginning of period nominal money holdings and M t+i is the end of period money hold­
ings. Note too the perpetuity interest rate is by construction expected to remain constant 
into the future.
In order to avoid discussion about the assumption about the money demand func­
tion, much of the fiscalist literature opts for eliminating money from the model- see Sims 
(1997), Cochrane (1999) and Woodford (2001). The reason is that money creation re­
sponds endogenously to inflation and other determinants of money demand. The resulting 
seigniorage revenue from the monetary base as a fraction of GDP is therefore QPPt A ^ + 1  
where in the UK - ^ p  [= lA is very small, o f the order of 0.03-0.05; hence it will con­
tribute a negligible fraction of movements in the UK government’s overall revenue. If I 
write the loge of money demand as In Pt -f £ In yt — £R t then this seigniorage term becomes 
/j,{7Tt +  CAlnj/t — Rt\. If I include this in the government budget constraint its perma­
nent value, /ilnt +  </y] would enter (2.36) as an extra element in t t; thus in (2.43) I would
have an extra term on the right hand side r ( 7  being fixed). The solution equation for in-
® 9
flation is unaltered, viz A 7 7  =  /c(Agt — A t t) +  rjt . In principle the value of k and A should 
allow for this extra term but as fi is so small I ignore it and so omit this seigniorage from 
the budget constraint in line with the majority of the earlier literature. Therefore, I exclude 
money from the government budget constraint and rewrite equation(2.34) as follows
B,t+i
R t
Gt — Tt + B t + Bt
Rt.
(2.35)
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The implied value of current bonds outstanding can be obtained by substituting for­
wards for future bonds outstanding yields
I represent equation (2.36) in terms of each period’s expected ’permanent’ tax and 
spending share, t t and gt, and assume that Tt+i = t tPt+iyt+i and Gt+i = gtPt+iVt+i- 
Simplifying equation (2.36) (see Appendix 2.10.3) yields
where R t = r* +  7 7  (respectively the perpetuity real interest rate and perpetuity 
inflation rate, both ’permanent’ variables), 7  is the ’permanent’ growth rate of real GDP. 
Permanent growth in this period it is assumed to be constant so that output (which is an 
1 ( 1 ) variable during this period) is assumed to be a random walk with constant drift equal 
to 7 . All these expected permanent variables are by construction expected to be constant in 
the future at today’s level.
In the case of inflation I impose on the model the simplifying assumption that it is a 
random walk, so that future expected inflation is equal to current inflation and is also there­
fore permanent inflation. Notice that in the rest of the model I have equations for output 
and real interest rates, in the IS and Phillips Curves (details are discussed in chapter 3); but 
these cannot detennine inflation as well. Hence if inflation had some dynamic time-path 
other than the random walk I would have to determine it exogenously; I choose the ran­
dom walk for simplicity, on the basis that the off-equilibrium wealth effect would operate 
so powerfully on excess demand that it would drive inflation at once to its permanent value.
(2.36)
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The pricing condition on bonds in equation (2.37) thus sets their value consistently 
with expected future primary surpluses. Suppose now the government reduces the present 
value of future primary surpluses. At an unchanged real value of the debt this would be 
a ’non-Ricardian’ fiscal policy move. According to the FTPL prices will adjust to reduce 
the real value of the debt to ensure the government budget constraint holds and thus the 
solvency condition is met. This is to be compared with the normal Ricardian situation, in 
which fiscal surpluses are endogenous so that fiscal shocks today lead to adjustments in 
future surpluses, the price level remaining unaffected.
Since the pricing equation sets the ratio of debt value to GDP equal to a function of 
permanent variables, it follows that this ratio bt follows a random walk such tha t 5
where r]t is an i.i.d. process.
This in turn allows me to solve for the inflation shock as a function of other shocks 
(especially shocks to government tax and spending). With the number of government bonds 
issued, B t, being pre-determined (issued last period) and therefore known at t-1, equation
(2.37) could be written as follows (taking logs and letting \ogx™e =  loga^ — E t~i loga^, 
the unexpected change in log x t)
5 A ’permanent’ variable x t is by definition a variable expected not to change in the future so that
Et xt+i — xt 
Thus x t+ i = x t +  et+ i
where et+i  is an i . i .d.error making the process a random walk.
(2.38)
and
A b t =  rjt (2.39)
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LHS of equation (2.37)
log bT = -  log R T  -  log P r  -  log vT  (2.40)
RHS of equation (2.37)
=  log (tt -  gt)ue -  log (1 +  7rt +  7 )ue -  log(r* -  7 )ue (2.41)
With all the variables in the equation defined to follow a random walk, I can rewrite the
above expression as
-A  log ( 7 7  +  r*) -  A 7 7  -  A7  =  A log ( 7  -  gt) -  A 7 7  -  A7  -  A log(r* -  7 ) (2.42)
Simplifying
- A lo g ( 7 7  +  r*t ) =  A log(^  -  gt) -  Alog(r^ -  7 ) (2.43)
Using a first-order Taylor Series expansion around the sample means
A(?7 + U*) = Afe -  gt) _  A(rJ -  7 )
7f + r* t — g r* — 7
Simplifying equation (2.44) I can obtain a solution for A 7 7  as a function of change in
government expenditure and tax rates
At7  =  «(Apt -  Aft) +  rjt (2.45)
where gt =  AAr#; ac =  2=^-, A =  7f, r*, t and g are mean values of the correspondingt g v 'y
variables. The term gt =  AAr* is treated as an error term.
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2.4.1 Time series properties of the data
I begin with some notes on the time-series behaviour of inflation and the other macro vari­
ables I am dealing with for this period (1970Q4-1978Q4). Table 2.7 shows that inflation, 
output, interest rates and money supply (M4) growth are all 1(1).
Unit root tests 7rt Vt Rt M t
Levels \ st Diff. Levels \ st Diff. Levels 1st Diff. Levels 1st D iff
ADF test statistic -2.107 -5.218 -0.906 -2.082 -1.952 -4.782 -3.177 -6.058
(0.243) (0.000)** (0.772) (0.038)* (0.605) (0.000)** (0.108) (0.000)**
PP test statistic -2.127 -7.561 -1.104 -7.201 -2.129 -4.666 -3.010 -8.591
(0.236) (0.000)** (0.702) (0.000)** (0.511) (0.000)** (0.146) (0.000)**
Table 2.7. Tests for non-stationarity of inflation, output, nominal interest rates and money 
supply (M4)
Notes on Table: MacKinnon’s critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) fo r  rejection o f hy­
pothesis o f  a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while * ** indicate significance 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. The number o f lags in the ADF tests is set using A IC  
criterion; for the PP tests using Newey-West bandwidth (Newey and West, 1987).
I now go on to estimate the best fitting A R M  A  for the inflation first difference. 
Starting with A R M  A  (0,0), I raise the order o f the A R  and M  A  each by one, and apply an 
F-test to test the validity of the lower order restriction. I find that any A R M  A  coefficients 
added to a random walk are insignificant, suggesting that UK inflation first difference, 
A 7vt, may well simply be A R M  A  (0,0), a pure random walk. However, of course it is also 
possible the dynamics are more complex, even if I cannot reject the simple random walk 
at the 5% level. I show below how the A IC  varies as one raises the order - Table 2.8. The 
approach I take to the dynamics of A ixt is to examine all these A R M  A  equations (except
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order 3,3 whose M A  roots lie outside the unit circle), in order to achieve robustness in the 
face of possibly more complex dynamics.
A R (  1) A R ( 2) AR{3)  M A {  1) M A ( 2) M A ( 3) A I C R 2
ARM A(0 ,0 ) - - - - -6.261 0.000
A R M A (  1,1) -0.371 - 0.512 - -6.138 -0.009
A R M A {  1,2) 0.270 - -0.296 -0.310 -6.185 0.065
A R M A (  1,3) -0.403 - 0.664 -0.351 -0.791 -6.280 0.174
A R M A (  2,0) 0.056 -0.360 - - - -6.213 0.097
A R M A {  2,1) 0.382 -0.367 - -0.393 - -6.173 0.088
A R M  4(2 ,2) 0.421 -0.463 - -0.441 0.115 -6.110 0.097
A R M A (  2,3) -0.666 -0.312 - 0.859 -0.020 -0.597 -6.251 0.203
ARMA(3 ,0 ) -0.003 -0.374 -0.160 - - -6.179 0.103
A R M A (  3,1) -0.835 -0.333 -0.458 0.952 - - -6.186 0.135
A R M A (  3,2) -0.955 -0.432 -0.449 1.094 0.131 -6.119 0.101
A R M  A(3,3)* -0.599 -0.482 0.377 1.565 0.738 -1.814 -7.356 0.746
Table 2.8. ARMA regressions:*=AR or MA roots outside unit circle
The fiscal variables, G/GDP and T/GDP, are shown in Figure 2.6. G/GDP is non- 
stationary: both the ADF and PP test suggest that it follows a pure random walk (Table 
2.9), which implies that its current value is also its trend or permanent value, gt. T/GDP 
is stationary around its mean with no significant deterministic trend; hence its trend or 
permanent value, t t , is simply a constant. I conclude that government expenditure is the 
only driving force for inflation that can be observed in the data . 6
Notes on Table: MacKinnon’s critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) fo r  rejection o f hy­
pothesis o f a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while *, ** indicate significance
6 For model convergence, the amount o f  government expenditure is required be less than taxation for gov­
ernment bonds to have a positive value. Note that since government expenditure o f  a capital variety is ex­
pected to produce future returns in line with real interest rates, 1 should deduct the trend in such spending 
from the trend in g (derived from the data shown in the Figure 2.6). To implement this, it is assumed that the 
average share o f  expenditure in the period devoted to fixed capital, health and education can be regarded as 
the (constant) trend in such capital spending; o f  course the ’capital’ element in total government spending is 
essentially unobservable and hence the assumption is intended merely to adjust the level o f  the g trend in an 
approximate way but not its movement over time which would be regarded as accurately capturing changes 
in current spending. The adjustment for these is o f  the order o f  10% o f GDP.
2.4 Data, estimation and testing
G/GDP
.40
.38-
.36-
.34-
.32-
.30-
.28-
.26
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
T/GDP
.46
.44-
.42-
.40-
.38-
.36-
.34
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Fig. 2.6. The patterns of government expenditure rate G/GDP and tax rate T/GDP.
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Unit root tests G/GDP T/GDP
Levels Ist Diff. Levels Ist Diff.
ADF test statistic -0.814 -8.393 -2.180
(0.953) (0.000)** (0.030)*
PP test statistic -1.576 -8.410 -3.379
(0.780) (0.000)** (0.001)**
Table 2.9. Tests for non-stationarity of deseasonalised government expenditure and tax- 
both to GDP ratio
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Number o f  lags in the ADF test is set upon A IC  cri­
terion and PP test upon Newey- West bandwidth (Newey and West, 1987).
2.4.2 Testing the assumptions about policy exogeneity
The FTPL makes particular assumptions about the exogeneity of monetary and fiscal vari­
ables. First, it assumes that money is entirely accommodating; thus it is produced as needed 
to equal the demand for money resulting from the behaviour of output, inflation and interest 
rates. Second, it assumes that government spending and taxation are set in a non-Ricardian 
way, that is they do not respond to the state o f  the public finances in a way that would re­
store fiscal balance. They can respond to other factors, such as unemployment or special 
interests but are independent o f the finances. I now set out the tests of these two assump­
tions.
Endogeneity o f money supply
The focus is on M4, as MO is generally agreed to have been supplied on demand 
during this period and indeed generally since WWII. The question therefore I ask here is 
whether M4 responds to the lagged behaviour of inflation, output and interest rates, all of 
which should enter the demand for money; I did not attempt to estimate a stable demand for
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money function as this has proved elusive (see for instance Fisher and Vega (1993), Astley 
and Haldane (1995), Fiess and MacDonald (2001)). However my aim is narrower: to check 
on whether M4 responds to these minimum determinants. I found that the growth of M4 
was 1 ( 1 ); other 1 ( 1 ) variables were inflation, the log of output, and the level of interest rates. 
Thus I checked an equation in the first differences of these variables, relating the change 
in M4 growth to the lagged changes in inflation, in output and in interest rates - Table 
2.10. One can see that this equation finds highly significant feedback of money growth 
to these determinants. 7 I also find below - section 2.8 - that there is no effect of lagged 
money growth on the error in the model. Thus there is evidence here that money growth is 
endogenous.
7 It might be suggested that a test should be made for whether there is an interest rate setting, Taylor rule 
in this period. However, as noted by Minford et al (2002), a Taylor rule equation is not identified on its own, 
since a variety o f full models imply an equation indistinguishable from it. The long-run cointegrating re­
lationship here gives a unit coefficient on inflation plus a relationship with the natural real rate; dynamics 
add further relationships with inflation both directly and via the two errors’ correlation with inflation. Hence 
after detrending one will obtain some relationship between interest rates and inflation; this cannot be dis­
tinguished from the Taylor rule family o f relationships. One can achieve identification by specifying a full 
alternative DSGE model with a Taylor rule. This could be tested by indirect inference in the manner o f  this 
chapter (Minford and Ou, 2009, do this for the US data post-1984); however, there are difficulties in specify­
ing a Taylor rule for this period as it would need to permit very high annual rates o f  inflation (up to 50%) in 
the mid-1970s. Some, eg Nelson (2003), has argued that the correct rule would imply indeterminacy, hence 
a sunspot solution. Since the sunspot can be any number and has infinite variance, a model that includes it 
is simply untestable. One could take the approach o f  Minford and Srinivasan (2009) and impose a termi­
nal condition to create determinacy in which case the Taylor rule could have a time-varying inflation target 
to accommodate the large swings in inflation. However, resolving these issues and specifying an alternative 
Taylor rule model for testing against the FTPL model here lie well outside the scope o f this chapter.
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Dependent variable A  2M t
Variable coefficient
constan t -0.000(0.001)
A7Tt_ i -0.117(0.157)
0.133(0.048)**
A  R t - i -0.484(0.109)**
F-test on joint significance (p-value) 0.000**
S.E.of regression 0.01
Misspecification tests (p-values)
F - A R 0.13
F - A R C H 0.12
Norm 0.40
F-H et 0.41
Table 2.10. Money endogeneity test
Notes on Table: standard errors in parenthesis. ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
Misspecification tests are carried out. F-AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test fo r  resid­
ual serial correlation up to forth order. F -A R C H  is an F-test fo r  autoregressive con­
ditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test fo r  residuals ’ 
non-normality. F-Het is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity.
Fiscal policy: non-Ricardian?
I test the fiscal policy assumption with the following equation
T
A s t =  ct +  ^   ^ryiA.dt-j +  Ut (2.46)
i=o
where st is government primary surplus as a percentage to GDP and dt is the debt to GDP 
ratio. Both variables are I(l)-confirmed by both ADF and PP tests - Table 2.11. Thus I 
test whether the budget surplus responds to the public debt, both in first differences - Table 
2.12 . There is evidently no feedback from changes in the debt/GDP ratio onto the primary
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surplus to GDP ratio, as a Ricardian regime would require: this is clear evidence therefore 
of a non-Ricardian fiscal regime.
Unit root tests St d t
Levels Diff. Levels Ist Diff.
ADF test statistic -2.679 -11.251 -2.920 -1.810
(0.251) (0.000)** (0.172) (0.067)
PP test statistic -0.963 -12.422 -3.051 -7.580
(0.293) (0.0000)** (0.135) (0.000)**
Table 2.11. Tests for non-stationarity of deseasonalised government surplus and debt- both 
to GDP ratio
Notes on Table: M acKinnon’s critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) fo r  rejection o f  
hypothesis o f  a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while ** indicate significance 
at the 1% level. The number o f  lags in the AD F tests is set using A IC  criterion; fo r  the PP 
tests using Newey-West bandwidth (Newey and West, 1987).
T  =  1 T  =  2 II CO T  =  4
a -0 .001(0.003) 0.001(0.003) 0.000(0.003) 0.000(0.003)
7o 0.407(0.215) 0 .625(0.255)* 0.544(0.278) 0.497(0.316)
7 i -0 .020(0.217) -0.046(0.215) -0.221(0.268) -0.368(0.306)
72 - 0.401(0.251) 0.396(0.267) 0.448(0.319)
73 - - -0.165(0.262) -0.258(0.292)
74 - - 0.167(0.297)
F -test on joint significance ip-value) 0.19 0.13 0.43 0.54
S .E .of regression 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Misspecification tests (p-values)
F - A R 0.25 0.30 0.44 0.01
F - A R C H 0.66 0.16 0.23 0.56
Norm 0.93 0.03 0.08 0.24
F-H et 0.64 0.83 0.13 0.13
Table 2.12. Fiscal policy exogeneity test
Notes on Table: standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
Misspecification tests are carried out. F-AR is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test fo r  resid-
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ual serial correlation up to forth order. F -A R C H  is an F-test fo r autoregressive con­
ditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque test fo r  residuals ’ 
non-normality. F-Het is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity.
2.5 Can FTPL account for the trend in inflation?
The theory above implies that there is a cointegrating relation between inflation and the 
other arguments of (2.45): if one integrates (2.45) one obtains
n t =  Kgt +  Art* — Ktt + c (2.47)
While c is a constant, both t t and r* are in principle random walks, I found empirically 
that t t was constant during this period. As for r*t again it is entirely possible that permanent 
real interest rates moved little. Thus it is likely that the only non-stationary variable on the 
right hand side that moves substantially is gt. If  so one would expect government spending 
and inflation to be cointegrated. Figure 2.7 compares the pattern o f inflation (7 rf) and public 
spending (gt): both are 1 ( 1 ) variables and plainly share some similarities in behaviour.
I examine the following relationship with an Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration
test
7rt = a + f3gt +  St (2.48)
Table 2.13 shows the estimating results. The stationarity of the estimated cointegrat­
ing vector cu = irt — a  — (3gt is established on ADF and PP tests, both of which reject 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. The result suggests there is a strong positive asso-
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Fig. 2.7. Patterns of inflation (7 rt) and public spending (gt)
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ciation between these two as suggested by the theory. Thus the FTPL’s implication that 
fiscal trends drive inflation is quite consistent with the data. Now I turn to the test I use for 
evaluating the inflation dynamics.
Engle-Granger(1987) approach
Estimated equation
TTt =  a  +  figt +  £t
a -0.065(0.021)**
(3 0.295(0.064)**
t-ADF test on e t -4.018*
5% critical value -3.390
S .E .of regression 0.01
Misspecification tests (p-values)
F - A R 0.12
F - A R C H 0.37
Norm 0.49
F-H et 0.04
Table 2.13. Cointegration analysis of inflation and public expenditure
Notes on table: standard errors in parenthesis. ** * denote significance at 5% 
and 1% level respectively. Mis specification tests are carried out. F-AR is the Lagrange 
Multiplier F-testfor residual serial correlation up to forth order. F -A R C  H  is an F-testfor 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque 
test fo r residuals ’ non-normality. F-Het is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity.
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Fig. 2.8. The flow chart of indirect inference
2.6 T he testin g  p ro ced u re
General speaking, indirect inference is a simulation-based method for estimating the para­
meters of economic models and it can be easily understood from Figure 2.8.
This diagram shows the way that indirect inference operates in the estimation process. 
This method chooses the parameters o f the economic model and simulates the model with 
chosen parameters. By carefully selecting an auxiliary model both simulated and observed 
data go through the auxiliary model and one could obtain a set of estimates based on these 
two types of data. One could compare these two sets o f estimates and indirect inference 
is to pick the value of the parameters to minimise the differences between these two esti­
mates. The diagram indicates the importance of using auxiliary as a bridge for observed 
data and simulated data. Its usefulness lies on its ability o f  estimating models whose like­
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lihood function is analytically difficult to evaluate. It is similar to other simulation-based 
techniques - to simulate data from the economic model for various values of the parame­
ters. Unlike the other methods, indirect inference exploits an auxiliary model to form the 
criterion function. Such an approximation need not be correctly stipulated. But when it is 
correctly indicated, indirect inference is equivalent to maximum likelihood estimation (see 
Smith, 1990 and Gourieroux et. al, 1993).
Example 1 Suppose that the economic model M  has the form o f
yt =  g(yt,  (L )y t , x t , (L )x t ,£t ,/3) t =  l , 2 , . . . , T ,  (2.49)
where yt denotes a series of observed endogenous variables, x t is a sequence of ob­
served exogenous variables, L  is the lag series L, L 2, L 3, ...Lk (where k is the maximum lag 
length) and et is the vector of structural equation errors. (3 is an n-dimensional parameter 
vector.
The auxiliary model, T, on the other hand, is defined by a conditional probability den­
sity function /  (yt \(L)yt x t , (L)xt , 9) that depends on an m-dimensional parameter vector 
9. It is required that in the application of indirect inference method - the number of para­
meters in the auxiliary model must be greater or at least equal to the number of parameters 
in the economic model.
The curial point is to choose the most appropriate value of (3 so that the estimates 
of 9 ((3) and 9 are as close as possible. In general, if the distance between those two is 
zero, one could conclude that the estimated parameters exactly the same in the economic 
and auxiliary models. The task o f indirect inference is to pick the value to minimise the
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distance. There is a large literature on indirect inference, firstly introduced by Smith (1993) 
and later extended in important ways by Gregory and Smith (1991, 1993) and Gourieroux 
et al (1993). Gourieroux and Monfort (1995) provide a useful survey of indirect inference. 
There have been many interesting applications of indirect inference to the estimation of 
economic models - see also Dridi et al (2007) and Hall et al (2010). But here I make a 
different use of indirect inference by taking value of estimated parameters as given (i.e. the 
calibrated values). The method constitutes a test of the model’s ability to ’fit the key facts’. 
The facts involved are suggested to be the key ones that a model must fit to be of ’use’ 
or ’interest’ in the context. Such key facts imply that model’s ability to replicate the data. 
Hence I represent the facts in the data by some distributions, say at the 95% confidence 
level, if the data facts lie inside these distributions, it is suggested that the model fits.
The reason behind this method is idea of ’the ability for the model to generate the 
data’. It is argued that eventhough the models fit well it may fail to behave dynamically 
like the data. While fitting data conditional on lagged endogenous and current exogeneous 
variable values is not the same as replicating data’s behaviour over time unconditionally (Le 
et al, 2009a). Also, the model’s shocks should be estimated from the data, not imposed, and 
that all the shocks should be used; but more importantly that model’s properties should be 
assessed against the data using their joint distributions which generally pose more stringent 
requirements than their single distributions viewed collectively (Le et al, 2009b).
The general idea is to test the model’s dynamic behaviour against that of the econ­
omy. It assumes that the structural model, M, in the case of the true model is the null 
hypothesis. The structural errors based on the data are used to generate the model’s simu­
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lated performance. Under the null, the random parts of the residuals are bootstrapped and 
the model simulated with these to generate a large number of sample replications. One then 
can derive the moments, impulse responses and the time series properties of the data, and 
test whether the model’s prediction can fit those of the data.
Indirect inference uses ’auxiliary’ representation such as a V A R  (for a group of vari­
ables) or an A R M  A  (for a single variable) as the vehicle to estimate and test the structural 
model. Meenagh et al (2009c) explain how the test can be conducted. There are three steps 
in the test. First, the structural models are solved and the errors which implied by the mod­
els conditional on actual data are computed. The models under the null hypothesis are the 
true ones hence the errors calculated based on the models are also considered to be the true 
errors. Second, the errors under the null are omitted variables, modelled by autoregressive 
processes of identically and independently distributed shocks, where the shocks which are 
extracted as the residual from their autoregressive processes. The empirical distribution is 
assumed to be given by the actual sample o f the residuals, and its variance and covariance 
is therefore the actual one. Given the true sample shocks, one could repeatedly resample 
them to obtain new samples from the distribution. Third, the parameters of the structural 
model are chosen to ensure the estimates simulated from the model are similar to those 
obtained from actual data (which is measured by the distance).
I now replicate the stochastic environment for the FTPL model to see whether the 
estimated dynamic equations for Airt could have been generated by this model. This I do 
by bootstrapping the model above with their error processes. The aim is to compare the 
performance of the auxiliary model based on observed data with its performance based
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on simulations o f the macroeconomic model derived from the given distributions of the 
parameters. This is relevant as here, when I am interested in the behaviour of a structural 
model whose structure is rather precisely specified by the theory.
I create pseudo data samples - here 1000 - for A n t. I randomly draw i.i.d. shocks 
in the error processes with replacement; I then input them into their error processes and 
these in turn into the model to solve for the implied path of A n t over the sample period. 
I then run A R M  A  regressions of the inflation first difference on all the pseudo-samples 
to derive the implied 95% confidence intervals for all the coefficient values found. Fi­
nally I compare the A R M  A  coefficients estimated from the actual data to see whether they 
lie within these 95% confidence intervals: under the null hypothesis these values repre­
sent the sampling variation for the A R M  A  coefficients which are generated by the model. 
The portmanteau Wald statistic - the 95% confidence limit for the joint distribution of the 
A R M  A  parameters- is also computed based on the distributions of these functions of the 
parameters of the auxiliary model. The Wald-statistic is derived from the bootstrap distrib­
ution of the A R M  A  parameters under the null hypothesis of the model. The Wald-statistic 
(Meenagh 2009a, 2009c) is calculated using following formula
( 7 - 7 ) ' £ - ' ( 7 - 7 ) '  (2-50)
7
where, is ^ e  inverse of the variance-covariance matrix of 7 , the A R M  A  para­
meter vector here generated by the bootstrap ( 7  is the mean of the bootstrap distribution). I 
arrange the values in ascending order and get the 5% critical percentile value for the model 
to be accepted as a whole. For the particular case of an A R M A ( 0,0) I use the joint distrib­
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ution of the coefficients o f an A R M A ( l ,  1 ) to check whether it encompasses the two zero 
coefficients found in the data.
Figure 2.9 below illustrates the method for two parameters in the auxiliary equation 
such as in an A R M  A{\ , \ ) .  The bootstrap distributions of these two parameters under the 
null are shown for two cases: one where the two parameter estimates are uncorrelated, 
the other where they are highly correlated (with a coefficient of 0.9). One can think of 
estimation via indirect inference as changing the parameters of the structural model, thus 
changing the implied distribution, so as to push the observed data point as far into the 
centre of the distribution as possible. The test however takes the structural parameters (and 
hence the bivariate distribution) as given and merely notes the position of the observed 
data point (here given as 0.1 and 0.9) in the distribution. The Wald statistic is computed 
as this position expressed as a percentile; thus for example 96 indicates that the observed 
parameter estimates lie on the 96% ’contour’, i.e. in the 95% rejection region.
2.7 T h e in d irec t in fe re n c e  resu lts
I now use equation (2.45) for Airt and bootstrap the random components of these A g 
and r] processes (since t is stationary and its trend value is a constant, it drops out on 
first-differencing). I obtain 1000 pseudo-samples of A n t then run an A R M  A  on each of 
these samples to generate the distribution o f the A R M  A  parameters. The Wald statistic 
then tests the model at the 95% level of confidence on the basis of the complete set of 
A R M  A  parameters. I use the bootstrapped samples to compare the model with the data
2.7 The indirect inference results 71
CorreMiorv>0
Fig. 2.9. Bivariate normal distributions (0.1, 0.9 shaded) with correlation of 0 and 0.9.
on its dynamic aspects - here the coefficients o f the A R M  A  for A7r*. O f course I have 
already established that g is a pure random walk and that inflation is close to that too, 
which suggests that the model will generate similar dynamics. I first show the A R M .4(1,1) 
case for illustration. 1 run 1000 A R M  A  regressions on the pseudo-samples to derive the 
implied 95% confidence intervals for both A R  and M A  coefficients. Then I compare the 
A R M  A  coefficients estimated from the observed data and I conclude that both A R  and 
M A  coefficients lie within these 95% confidence intervals. I also look at the bootstrap 
sample variance: the variance of A 7  ^ in levels in the data sample is 0.000116 lies inside 
the 95% model bounds; the 95% bounds for the bootstrap samples are 0.000088 (lower) 
and 0.000223 (upper) respectively. Thus the model replicates the data variance. The Full 
Wald statistic includes all A R M  A  parameters and variance of A7T* and the result suggests 
the model as a whole is not rejected by the data.
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Model Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT 
Lower Upper
A R ( \ ) -0.371 -0.936 0.913 IN
M A (  1) 0.512 -1.052 1.379 IN
V a r ( A i r t ) 0.00011551 0.0000B759 0.00022325 IN
Wald statistic 16.9%
Full wald Statistic 18.3%
Table 2.14. Confidence limits o f first-differenced inflation process for theoretical 
ARMA(1,1)
If I disregard the A R M A ( 3,3) as unstable, Table 2.15 reports that the Wald statis­
tics for all the A R M A s  as well as Full Wald statistics for A R M  As plus variance lie inside
the 95% bounds. The more elaborate the dynamics that are estimated, the closer the model
gets to being rejected; but this is a normal occurrence with indirect inference. The DSGE
models impose stringent theoretical assumptions on behaviour, so that the more complex
the representation of the data’s behaviour the less well does the model replicate that behav­
iour. Here I find the model very easily encompasses the random walk but encompasses less
well the more complicated dynamic schemes that can be found in the data.
Wald statistic ( A R M  A  only) Full wald statistic (A R M  A  and variances)
A R M A ( 0 , 0 ) 0.01% 20.2%
A R M A ( \ , \ ) 16.9% 18.3%
A R M A ( \ , 2 ) 21.9% 24.1%
A R M A ( \ , 3 ) 76.8% 70.2%
A R M A (  2,0) 85.7% 79.9%
A R M A (  2,1) 67.5% 61.0%
A R M A (  2,2) 45.2% 38.0%
A R M A (  2,3) 58.7% 56.9%
A R M A ( 3 , 0 ) 80.2% 75.2%
A R M A ( 3 , \ ) 94.3% 93.2%
A R M A ( 3 , 2 ) 84.3% 82.0%
Table 2.15. Wald statistics and Full wald statistics for variety of ARMA representations
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2.8 W h a t o th e r  d y n a m ic  fa c to rs  cou ld  be a ffectin g  in flation?
The results reported in previous section suggest that the theoretical model does replicate 
the dynamic behaviour o f inflation. It is worth noting however, that it does so when the 
model s structural error, jjt, in equation (2.45) is included as implied by the model and the 
data. This error, which has the interpretation of omitted variables, is found to be serially 
correlated which implies that the theory above only works approximately because if  it were 
exact then this error would be serially uncorrelated. In the rest o f this section I explore what 
these omitted influences on inflation may have been.
I begin by carefully identifying the time-series properties of this error. Note that since 
eu the error in the cointegrating equation (2.48), is stationary, the error in the dynamic 
equation (2.45), r\t =  A e t, is also stationary but will in general not be i.i.d., rather an 
A R M  A  process. Estimating it I find indeed that this is the case - Table 2.16. If I ignore 
A R M As with roots outside the unit circle (asterisked) I find that the best relationship is 
A R M A {  1,3).
A R (  1) A R ( 2) A R ( 3 )  M A (  1) M A ( 2) M A { 3) A I C R 2
A R M A ( \ , \ ) 0.115 - - 0.262 - - -6.166 0.101
A R M A ( \ , 2 ) -0.695 - - 1.422 0.774 - -6.352 0.274
A R M  A ( \ , 3 ) -0 .479 - - 1.139 0.313 -0.394 -6.363 0.302
A R M  A(2,0) 0.408 -0.181 - - - - -6.152 0.118
A R M A (  2 ,1) 1.264 -0.417 - -0.955 - - -6.133 0.126
A R M A ( 2 , 2 ) 1.107 -0.272 - -0.779 -0.190 - -6.082 0.107
A R M A (  2,3) 0.144 0.507 - 0.439 -0.611 -0.819 -6.295 0.297
A R M A ( 3 , 0 ) 0.392 -0.141 -0.114 - - - -6.062 0.096
A R M A (  3,1) -0.364 0.190 -0.411 0.979 - - -6.279 0.293
A R M  4l(3,2)* 0.098 0.665 -0.460 0.858 -0.990 - -6.665 0.533
A R M A ( 3 , 3 ) * 0.315 0.794 -0.440 1.527 -1.215 -2.120 -7.555 0.813
Table 2.16. ARMA regressions for change in error o f cointegrating vector. *= AR or MA 
roots outside unit circle
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What now interests me is what lagged factors are influencing this error; current fac­
tors I know include all the innovations in the shocks to the economy. My method of inves­
tigation is to regress this error as an Error Correction Mechanism on a variety of candidate 
variables that could influence the dynamics o f inflation via the usual channels of aggregate 
demand and supply that are omitted from the model’s inflation determination. Significant 
factors could suggest ways the model could be enriched dynamically in future versions. 
The significance o f both the ^  and 8 - Table 2.17-  suggest the presence of dynamic effects 
on inflation that the model does not capture; there is rather rapid error correction and pos­
itive reaction to lagged interest rate rises. Thus the model’s dynamics could be enriched 
in ways that further work could investigate. Notice that money growth is insignificant, 
consistently with my earlier finding that it is entirely endogenous.
Estimated equation
Vt = &£t = a + S I i  0 iA 2M t-i + Y^=1 l A y t - i  + Y^= 1 <PiARt-i
a
Pi
7 i
i 1
02
5
S .E .of regression 
M isspecification tests (p-values)
i +  5et-1 +  Ut
-0.000(0.002)
0.256(0.188)
-0.022(0.050)
0.306(0.147)*
0.271(0.131)*
-0.587(0.186)**
0.01
F - A R 0.17
F - A R C H 0.35
Norm 0.57
F -H et 0.83
Table 2.17. Omitted variable test
2.9 Conclusion 75
Notes to table: standard errors in parenthesis. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. Misspecification tests are carried out. F-AR is the Lagrange 
Multiplier F-test fo r  residual serial correlation up to forth order. F - A R C H  is an F-test fo r  
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Norm is normality chi-Square Bera-Jarque 
test fo r  residuals ’ non-normality. F-H et is F-test fo r  residuals heteroskedasticity.
2.9 C o n clu sio n
The chapter investigates whether the Fiscal Theory o f the Price Level can explain UK in­
flation in the 1970s, a period in which the government greatly increased public spending 
without raising taxes and monetary policy was accommodative; I find evidence that fiscal 
policy behaved exogenously with respect to the state of the public finances and that money 
growth behaved entirely endogenously, thus identifying the policy assumptions of the Fis­
cal Theory. Its implied model of inflation is tested in two ways: for its trend using cointe­
gration analysis and for its dynamics using the method of indirect inference. I find that it is 
not rejected. But I also find that the model’s errors indicate omitted dynamics. Taken with 
the low power of the indirect inference procedure for this single equation structural model 
of inflation, this suggests that the inflation equation’s dynamics merit further research.
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2.10 Appendices
2.10.1 FTPL literature review
The theoretical literature
Traditionally, monetary policy sets the money supply (or interest rates) in order to 
meet an inflation or price level target while fiscal policy is assumed to adjust to ensure bal­
ance on the budget. This is the situation in which monetary policy is described as ’active’ 
and fiscal policy as ’passive’ or ’Ricardian’ (Leeper, 1991). The change in the quantity of 
money would lead to an equal proportional change in the price level hence an unchanged 
level of real money. Another case is where fiscal policy is ’active’ (i.e. sets government 
spending and taxes without regard to ultimate budget balance - ’non-Ricardian’) and mon­
etary policy is ’passive’, that is it sets money supply endogenously in response to money 
demand at whatever market interest rates prevail. Here the government intertemporal bud­
get constraint (IBC) is not satisfied at any point in time for any arbitrary sequence of price 
levels; and in order for there to be equilibrium in the economy with the IBC satisfied, a 
particular sequence of price levels/inflation must be chosen for which the IBC is satisfied. 
This is the case of FTPL - see also Sims (1994, 1997) and Woodford (1995, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b, 2001). For FTPL to be an interesting theory, it is not necessary to have it always 
hold, but only in some contexts . 8
8 A related but subtly different case is where fiscal policy is active in the above sense but monetary policy  
ensures by suitable choice o f  money supply or interest rates to generate an inflation path and so seigniorage 
that exactly ensures the satisfaction o f  government IBC. This sets inflation so as to ensure budget balance, 
so that if  the present value o f  future government surpluses is reduced, seigniorage must rise to ensure the 
government IBC is satisfied. Future inflation would be higher if  the monetary authority is trying to reduce
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The Quantity Theory o f Money argues that the equilibrium price level is set by equat­
ing the real purchasing power o f money stock to the real demand for money. Hence, the 
change o f price level can be controlled by changing the money stock in that sense. Sargent 
and Wallace (1981) highlight the conditions under which the monetary authority might lose 
control of the price level. They argue that under the open-market operations if the govern­
ment debt is positive at some level, controlling inflation by continuing to sell the stationary 
stock of interest-bearing bonds can be unsuccessful. Sargent (1987) states that “monetary 
and fiscal policies must be coordinated in the sense that, given a process for government 
expenditure, processes for inflation and the money stock cannot be chosen independently 
if they are to satisfy the government’s present-value budget constraint”. Even though their 
framework still supports monetary price determination, inflation is not a purely monetary 
phenomenon. The traditional view o f  price determination has thus been challenged by the 
new theory. The main framework o f the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level concerns the gov­
ernment’s IBC, where -nomin—debt -  =  present value of real surpluses. This equation worksgeneral price level 1
in the same way as the quantity theory o f money determination, where the price level is 
determined by the ratio o f debt and surplus.
I review the FTPL using a simple model in order to provide a better understanding of 
the theory. This theory begins with the idea that the price level can be determined even if 
the interest rate is fixed. It differs to the conventional view because it provides an additional 
constraint to pin down the price level. Such an idea comes from that the government sol­
inflation and seigniorage today with a fix ed  government surplus trajectory. This is the case o f  ’unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic’ (Sargent and W allace, 1981). Here monetary policy is ’active’ like fiscal policy but 
subordinates itself to the needs o f  the IB C , and thus can be described as ’follow ing’ fiscal policy.
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vency condition is being satisfied only in equilibrium. The price level, which determined 
by the solvency condition also ensures the government IBC holds in equilibrium. Unlike 
the process developed by Sargent and Wallace (1981), FTPL does not consider the active 
and passive aspect of the story, it introduces a theory of the “jumping general price level 
without increasing money” which replaces the quantity theory of money with a quantity 
theory of the public debt (Woodford, 1995).
Consider the following money-in-utility (MIU) model where the representative agent 
has preferences over consumption and real money balances
of period real money holdings. The use o f the end of money stock instead of beginning 
of period money stock is crucial here. As argued by the Buiter (1998) the cash-in-arrears 
framework ensures price level determinacy under a fixed nominal interest rate . 9  I follow 
Woodford (1995) cash-in-arrears approach.
The representative household maximises the expected present discounted value of 
utility of the form (i.e. Buiter, 2002)
9 Buiter (1998) argues that the price level is overdetermined if  transactions technology has ’cash-in-advance’ 
features.
where, f3 is the discount factor, Ct denotes the real consumption and is the end
Household
The representative agent budget constraint can be written as
P,  ^  ( l  +  R t + 1 ) P t
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where, A t is the real endowment, R t is the nominal interest rate, that is, the govern­
ment is issuing a nominal bond this period costing £ 1  and promises to pay interest rate of 
R t£ next period. Tt is lump-sum tax that the household must pay. The representative agent 
maximizes the discounted stream of utility by choosing Ct, M t+1  and &t+i subject to the 
budget constraint. The first order conditions o f the household’s optimization problems are
C r  = At (A.4)
p -  ( ~ P T )  =  ~
( i + R t + i ) P t =  P p R 7  ( A 6 )
where, Xt is the Lagrange multiplier to the representative agent’s budget constraint.
Substituting equation (A.6 ) in (A.4), as well as using the Fisher equation (1 +  rt )
(1 +  Rt) yields the consumption Euler equation
( & ) " ’  =  0  (! +  r ‘) (A -7)'°
The money demand function is similar obtained by combining equations (A.4), (A.5) 
and (A.6 )
c r  = ( i 3 £ r )  (A.8 )
=  'I )  C‘ (A-9)
Equation (A.9) shows the relationship between the demand for real balances and the 
consumption. The higher the consumption the higher the real money required. While the
10 The Euler equation has the conventional meaning.
11 I first divide equation (A .5) by At yields:
_ i _  f  M*+1)  =  4 -  -  (3-ft— ^ - .C o m b in in g  with equations (A.4) and (A.6) one would obtain the
Af Pt y Pt J *t  Ptq-i At
expression for money demand function.
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high the nominal interest rate leads to lower money balances. Equations (A.7) and (A.9) 
are the equilibrium conditions for an identical household.
Government
The government IBC
%  + 1  =  -  G< +  ^  +  <A 1 °)
where Tt includes all tax revenues except the seigniorage revenues, Gt denotes the 
government expenditure. The nominal value of government bond B t is discounted by 
i +#~ -  I denote the government’s financial liabilities by comprise both outstanding bonds 
and money issued to the public. Substituting L t = M t +  Z^into equation (A. 10) the con­
straint can be expressed as
Lt = (Tt ~ Gt) Pt + j^ T — Lt+i + ( i f g t r )
Substituting forwards for future liabilities
£  |  n  (i+fe~) _(T t+j -  G t +j )  P t+ j + (lfi j j+J M t+ j+1_ | (A-n )
To ensure government not to involve in the Ponzi game, it is required that the gov­
ernment transversality condition must be satisfied at all time
T
limr^oo f ]  ( i+At+i)  L t+T = 0 (A. 12)
In equilibrium, the entire model can be summarised as follows
1 = 0  (1 + rt) (A .13)
( t t )  ’ =  ^ ( ^ )  C l  (A .14)
-< =  E  { f l  ( i + f c r )  [(Tt+1 -  c t+3) p t+3 +
j = 1
t + j + 1
Woodford (1995) argues that price level can be determinable under a fixed interest 
rate rule. Price level is adjusted automatically to ensure the government solvency condition
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is satisfied. The problem o f price indeterminacy rises because the nominal interest rate is 
fixed in equation (A. 14). Although the real balances are determined from this equation, 
there are no unique solutions for price level and money supply. In short, any combination 
of price level and money supply can lead to a same level of real money balances. This is 
what called ’nominal indeterminacy’ in dynamic models. But this problem can be solved 
under the case of FTPL. Rewrite condition (A. 15) by dividing both side of the equation by 
the general price level
With an additional constraint (A. 16), the price level can be identified as both real in­
terest rate and real money balances are determined in equations A. 13 and A. 14 respectively.
In Woodford’s ’Really Unpleasant Arithmetic’ he argues that instability in fiscal pol­
icy have an impact on the price level no matter how much the monetary authority commits 
to its policy. This implies that fiscal policy alone can influence price level. Thus, to ensure 
price stability, monetary authorities must work well with fiscal authorities when adopting 
a policy. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) use a simple example to illustrate the how the 
monetary authorities may fail to control price stability in non-Ricardian framework. I can 
also easily to show in the example under exogenous government’s fiscal rule (specific pol­
icy rule) the monetary authorities would lose control over the price stability. For simplicity, 
it is assumed the government nominal taxes follow an exogenous process where the gov­
ernment can adjust its tax revenues to fully compensate the loss of seigniorage revenues
g{,E!te)[|T' -fit+.7 + 1 Mt +. 7 + 1P t + j (A-16)
TtPt =  T P t +  A  M t+1 (A. 17)
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Thus deficits are fully backed by bonds and taxes. Hence the government budget 
constraint can be rewritten as
Equation (A. 19) is the fiscal equation for the price determination. Note that both 
money and nominal interest rate are absent from the equation. Monetary authorities have 
no control of price using monetary instruments. Price level is purely determined by the 
value of government bonds and its primary surplus (deficit if negative).
In addition, Woodford (1995) argues that price level can be determined even if the 
demand and supply for government fiat money is nonexistent. This has important policy 
implication as what should be included in the government IBC is questioned. The substitu­
tion between government fiat money and other financial equivalent is more possible if price 
is determined by government budget debt. As one can see from equation (A. 19), there is no 
government fiat money enters the equation because government can adjust its tax revenues 
to fully compensate the loss o f seigniorage revenues. Hence price level is completely in­
dependent to money. With money redundancy, the price level still can be formally pinned 
down.
In particular, Woodford (1996 and 1998a) argue that in non-Ricardian environments 
there are possibilities that aggregate demand would be affected by fiscal shocks. This is 
because, as he states, part of households’ net wealth is government debt hence their future 
consumption is affected by the exogeneity o f government deficits. Woodford (2001) em­
and the corresponding government solvency condition becomes
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phasizes that price stability requires an appropriate commitment on fiscal rules, even when 
monetary policy is active. He shows that inflation targeting cannot be successful if fiscal 
policy is not consistent with such an equilibrium determined by monetary policy. Even if 
these two policies are consistent with an equilibrium stable price level, there is a possibil­
ity for the government budget choice to influence people’s expectations. In such a case a 
policy rule to commit the government budget deficit is necessary for price stabilization.
Sims (1997) argues that fiscal policy should play an equal role with monetary pol­
icy in the process o f price determination. For a monetary union, so long as there is no 
central fiscal authority to control fiscal instruments, individual countries with positive debt 
should commit themselves to increased primary surpluses in the future. This is because an 
individual government can increase the welfare of its citizens in equilibrium by commit­
ting to a lower or even a negative level of primary surpluses, hence leading to an upward 
jump of that country’s price level and a permanent increase in the consumption of its citi­
zens, transferred from the rest. This implies that there should be institutional controls and 
penalties for preventing individual countries from over-issuing debt at the expense of other 
countries’ wealth. The only successful monetary union would be the one with limits on 
borrowing.
Thus theoretically there is the possibility for fiscal policy to influence the price level, 
even if the relevance o f the FTPL is questioned in contributions such as Buiter (1999) and 
McCallum (2001). Cochrane (1999) argues that the government IBC holds in equilibrium 
for both Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes. Hence whether the equilibrium is restored 
by either budget surplus (Ricardian) or by prices (non-Ricardian) is an empirical matter
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that requires testing a full model of the economy - see also Cochrane (2000, 2001). He 
also argues that “the FTPL per se has no testable implications for the time series of debt, 
surpluses and price level” . This is due to the fact that the government budget constraint 
written in nominal terms holds in both Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes - a problem 
of ’observational equivalence’. Whether this equilibrium is restored by price or surplus ad­
justments remains unclear. The variables determined by the equilibrium conditions (A. 13) 
to (A. 15) are valid under both regimes. Hence, all one observes are equilibrium points, but 
not the fundamentals behind them. The FTPL requires that the government is pursuing a 
’non-Ricardian’ fiscal policy. But simply testing government sustainability is not evident to 
identify the regimes. This is because present value of government budget constrain is rather 
an equilibrium condition. By observing the equation (A. 19) does not permit to distinguish 
between Ricardian and non-Ricardian regimes.
Buiter (1999,2002) supports this view and states that “the government’s IBC is a con­
straint on the government’s instruments that must be satisfied for all values of the economy- 
wide endogenous variables” . In particular, Buiter (1999) argues that economy would not 
be correctly specified if the government IBC failed to hold in all actual price sequences. 
However, as I can see from Cochrane’s argument, this does not imply that FTPL does not 
hold; I observe an equilibrium sequence o f prices where IBC holds but this can come from 
an FTPL economy or one with the traditionally assumed active monetary and passive fiscal 
policy.
McCallum (2001,2003) establish a simple closed economy model and argue that un­
der FTPL the solution is not leamable because the price level solution involves a bubble
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component. The traditional or monetarist representation can by contrast be learnt - see also 
McCallum and Nelson (2005). Yet they fail to notice that FTPL creates a world that is ob- 
servationally equivalent, as noted by Cochrane (see also Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2000); 
the price solution is determined by the fiscal policy and in this case the bubble components 
are eliminated. As for Teamability’ this appears to be an irrelevant consideration since fis­
cal and monetary policies are often announced via numerous policy statements; certainly 
they can be so announced, thus bypassing learning.
Gordon and Leeper (2006) generalise the FTPL, arguing that the price level is jointly 
determined by both current and expected future monetary and fiscal policies. The quantity 
theory of money and FTPL are considered as two restricted special cases. It is argued that 
with expenditures fully backed by tax revenues the quantity theory should account for price 
determination. On the other hand, when the central bank engages in the bond transaction 
(i.e. supports the bond prices during war time), the FTPL is more plausible. They conclude 
that “both theories require special assumptions on policy behaviour which are unlikely to 
hold in general. They are two special cases of price determination”.
The empirical literature
In recent years FTPL have been received a lot of attention empirically. Bohn (1998) 
establishes a backward-looking econometric model to analyse the relationship between pri­
mary surplus-to-GDP and the (lagged) debt-to-GDP for U.S. He finds a positive response 
of surpluses to debt and hence that government budget is sustainable over the sample pe­
riod. Although his work does not directly link to the FTPL, his findings support the view
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of monetary dominance. Canzoneri et al (2001) investigate U.S. data for the period 1951- 
1995. Unlike Bohn (1998) they use a forward-looking approach for testing the theory of 
fiscal dominance and focus on a set o f impulse response functions involving the primary 
surplus and total government liabilities (both as ratios to GDP). They find that a positive 
innovation in the surplus decreases liabilities for several periods and increases future sur­
pluses. A positive innovation in surplus in period t pays off some of the debt in period t, 
since the response of surplus in period t + 1  is also positive, then more debt are paid off in 
period t+1. The positive autocorrelations in the surplus process is also plausible under the 
Ricardian regime: the disturbances are likely to be persistent as election cycles and business 
cycles take years to complete. They argue that this is most plausibly interpreted as a Ri­
cardian regime. Loyo (1999) addresses the inflationary episodes in Brazil using the FTPL 
and shows that a tight monetary policy along with lose fiscal policy would lead to hyperin­
flation. The work of Tanner and Ramos (2003) also finds evidence of fiscal dominance for 
the case of Brazil for some important periods.
Working within the context of a full DSGE model, Davig and Leeper (2007), Davig 
et al (2007) examine regime switches between fiscal and monetary policy for U.S. They 
define the Ricardian policy regime as an ’active’ monetary policy coupled with a ’passive’ 
fiscal policy- the policy mix implicit in the literature on the Taylor principle. In contrast, 
the non-Ricardian regime is where fiscal policy dominates (is ’active’) and monetary policy 
is accommodative or ’passive’ - this is the combination associated with the FTPL (Davig 
et al 2007). They model regime change as an on-going process and show that as long as 
agents are allowed to place probability on both kinds of regimes happening, and if  active
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fiscal policy is expected to occur next period, then tax changes would have wealth effects 
and lead to non-Ricardian outcomes. Another attempt to locate regime switching is due 
to Favero and Monacelli (2005). They investigate U.S. data for the period of 1960-2002 
and conclude that U.S. monetary policy shifted between active and passive. Other work on 
regime changes includes Leeper and Zha (2003), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), Davig and 
Leeper (2009a, 2009b). Thus the FTPL can be regarded as a particular policy regime- one 
of ’active’ or ’dominant’ fiscal policy - within a sequence of different policy regimes.
For European economies, Afonso (2002) applies a panel data approach for the EU-15 
countries during the period 1970-2001 and the result does not support the view of FTPL. 
He concludes that countries tend to react positively to the increases in the government 
liabilities - a Ricardian regime. Janssen et al (2002) analyse the change o f the UK inflation 
path under the impact of both monetary and fiscal policy. By examining 300 years data, 
they find that there is little inter-relationship between fiscal policy and the general price 
level. Creel et al (2005) test the FTPL by investigating the interactions between government 
surplus, debt accumulation and price dynamics on French data. Although some findings 
agree with FTPL their main results support the Ricardian fiscal policy rule. Semmler and 
Zhang (2004) consider empirical evidence on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the 
Euro area. They explore fiscal regimes with a VAR model and find empirical evidence that 
a non-Ricardian fiscal policy has been pursued in both France (1970-1998) and Germany 
(1967-1998).
Bihan and Creel (2006) use the Canzoneri et al (2001) VAR methodology on French, 
German, Italian, UK and US data. In this approach they assume a FTPL regime and try to
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reject the assumption o f FTPL through the results acquired from impulse response func­
tions (IRFs). They conclude that the FTPL is rejected in the case of all five countries. 
However, when structural balance data is used FTPL seems plausible for the UK. Sabate et 
al (2006) argue that Spanish government does not have barriers to monetize budget deficits 
for some important periods. They estimate a stationary VAR model and to examine the dy­
namic link between budget and money for Spain for the period 1874 to 1935. Although 
their work does not concentrate on the theory of the price determination their findings sup­
port the dominance o f fiscal policy.
Thams (2007) uses a Bayesian VAR to test for the FTPL on German and Spanish 
data over the period 1980 to 2000 based on the Canzoneri et al (2001) framework. They 
find evidence of non-Ricardian equilibria for Spain. Bajo-Rubio et al (2009) argue that fis­
cal sustainability can be achieved in two ways: one is through the endogenous adjustment 
of the primary budget surplus (Ricardian), the other is through the endogenous adjustment 
of the price level (FTPL). In their empirical approach, they estimate a cointegration re­
lationship between primary surplus-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP over the period 1970-2005 
for eleven EU countries on the country-to-country basis. Their findings support the fiscal 
policy sustainability in all the EMU countries except Finland where there is no significant 
response of primary surplus to the debt-GDP ratio, pointing to the possibility of a non- 
Ricardian or FD regime. However, the solvency condition holds under both Ricardian and 
Non-Ricardian regimes. In order to distinguish regimes, they perform Granger-causality 
tests between these two variables for those countries. But the results from the tests did not 
give a clear conclusion about the prevalence o f either regime.
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2.10.2 Data and Sources
-  Inflation: defined as the Consumer Price Level (CPI) deflator, Nominal Total consumption (n t c )
v '  1 R ea l T o tal C o n su m p tio n  (R T C )
- Government Expenditure: Total Managed Expenditure excludes debt interest pay­
ment. (TME= Total current expenditure + Net Investment +Depreciation)
- Government Revenue: Total Current Receipts
- GDP: Gross Domestic Product: chained volume measures: Seasonally adjusted
- Nominal Interest Rate: Sterling certificates of deposit: 3 months: bid rate: end 
period observation
- Money Supply M4: Money Stock M4 (end period), Level, Seasonally adjusted
- Primary Surplus: Difference between Government Expenditure and Revenue - Fig­
ure 2 . 1 0
- Debt: Public Sector Finances Net Debt (data is unavailable in quarterly frequency, 
author converts) - Figure 2 . 1 0
Source: UK Office fo r  National Statistics (ONS) databank
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Fig. 2.10. Patterns of government primary surplus-to-GDP ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio.
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2.10.3 Derivation of government budget constraint
The government budget constraint can be written as
where,
Gt is the government spending in money terms,
Tt is the government taxation in money terms,
R t is the amount of nominal interest the government must pay. The value of the 
bonds outstanding is B  x -f .
I can derive an expression for government budget constraint in the forward direction 
by substituting forwards for future bonds outstanding, yields
If Tt+i and Gt+i are growing with money G D P ,
he. Tt+i — ttPt+iUt+i
Gt+i — 9tPt+iVt+i
B t   y ^ o o  ( t t —gt )Pt+iVt+i
Rt  ~ T^i=0 (l+i?t )1+i
=  Y Z o  ^  | ()1itT+7rt  ^ (note that real output grows at rate 7 )
= (tt -  gt) PtVt Y ■*=o (i+/?t)1+l
'OO (l+7 + 7Tt)1 + I
'*=0 (l+/?t)1+J(l+7+7r«)
OO (1+7+7Tt)t
(tt -  gt) Ptyt Y-
If 7  and 7rt are both small enough,
E OO (1+7+7Tt)1+1 i = 0  ( 1+ R t ) 1+l y ° °  ( ____1------ Y +' = (0 l+ i?t—7 —TTt J I
H e n c e  —nciiv^c, n. p. ( U - g t )’’ R t P t y t  ( l + 7 + 7Tt)(rt* - 7 )
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2.10.4 Details of indirect inference tests
2.10.1 A R M A (  1,2)
M odel Estimated 95*M> Confidence interval IN/OUT 
L ow er Upper
A R ( \ ) 0.270 -0 .9 2 9 0.902 IN
M A {  1) -0.296 -1 .2 1 5 1.233 IN
M A {  2) -0.310 -0 .5 8 6 0.917 IN
Wald statistic 21.9%
Full w ald  statistic 24.1%
Table 2.18. Confidence limits o f change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(1,2)
2.10.2 A R M A ( l , 3 )
M odel Estimated 95*% Confidence interval IN/OUT  
L ow er Upper
A R (1 ) -0.403 -0 .9 4 7 0.948 IN
M A (  1) 0.664 -1 .3 4 3 1.329 IN
M A {  2 ) -0.351 -0 .7 1 8 0.739 IN
M A ( 3 ) -0.791 -0 .8 7 2 0.865 IN
Wald statistic 76.8%
Full w ald  statistic 70.2%
Table 2.19. Confidence limits o f change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(1,3)
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2.10.3 A R M A { 2 f i )
M odel Estimated 95% Confidence Interval IN/OUT  
Lower Upper
,4/7(1) 0.056 -0.361 0.360 IN
A R( 2 ) -0.360 -0.371 0.299 IN
Wald statistic 85.7%
Full Wald Statistic 79.9%
Table 2.20. Confidence limits o f change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(2,0)
2.10.4 A R M A ( 2,1)
Model Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT  
Lower Upper
A R (1) 0.382 -1.033 1.040 IN
A R (  2) -0.367 -0.423 0.344 IN
M A ( \ ) -0.393 -1.060 1.407 IN
Wald statistic 67.5%
Full wald statistic 61.0%
Table 2.21. Confidence limits of change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(2,1)
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2.10.5 A R M A ( 2,2)
Model Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT
Lower Upper
A R (  1) 0.421 -1.296 1.219 IN
A R (  2) -0.463 -0.953 0.713 IN
M A ( \ ) -0.441 -1.529 1.502 IN
M A {  2) 0.115 -0.983 2.101 IN
Wald statistic 45.2%
Full Wald Statistic 38.0%
Table 2.22. Confidence limits o f change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(2,2)
2.10.6 A R M A Q A )
M odel Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT  
Lower Upper
A R (  1) -0.666 -1.274 1.323 IN
AR( 2 ) -0.312 -0.911 0.745 IN
M A (  1) 0.859 -1.584 1.511 IN
M A ( 2 ) -0.020 -1.084 1.831 IN
M  A(3) -0.597 -0.903 0.938 IN
Wald statistic 58.7%
Full wald statistic 56.9%
Table 2.23. Confidence limits of change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(2,3)
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2.10.7 A R M A { 3,0)
M odel Estimated 95% Confidence Interval IN/OUT 
Lower Upper
A R (1) -0.003 -0.383 0.364 IN
A R {  2) -0.374 -0.382 0.319 IN
A R (  3) -0.160 -0.358 0.353 IN
Wald statistic 80.2%
Full Wald Statistic 75.2%
Table 2.24. Confidence limits of change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(3,0)
2.10.8 A R M A ( 3 , l )
M odel Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT 
Lower Upper
A R (  1) -0.835 -0.977 0.995 IN
A R{ 2) -0.333 -0.466 0.383 IN
A R (  3) -0.458 -0.398 0.394 OUT
M A (  1) 0.952 -1.468 1.426 IN
Wald statistic 94.3%
Full wald statistic 93.2%
Table 2.25. Confidence limits of change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(3,1)
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2.10.9 A R M A ( 3 , 2 )
Model Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT 
Lower Upper
A R ( \ ) -0.955 -1.193 1.239 IN
AR( 2 ) -0.432 -0.984 0.743 IN
A R (  3) -0.449 -0.449 0.446 OUT
M A ( \ ) 1.094 -1.624 1.568 IN
M A { 2 ) 0.131 -1.099 2.129 IN
Wald statistic 84.3%
Full wald statistic 82.0%
Table 2.26. Confidence limits of change in inflation process for theoretical ARMA(3,2)
Chapter 3 
The open economy DSGE model
I now introduce a completed strand o f the model by adding a forward-looking IS 
curve, derived in the usual way from the household Euler equations and the goods market- 
clearing condition and a New Classical Phillips Curve. New Classical model is more ap­
propriate here as it allows that price/inflation to jump to whatever level is needed to satisfy 
the government budget constraint. I assume that inflation moves because of excess demand 
hence the implicit price/inflation rigidity will not be considered in this setup. I would like to 
see under the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level framework how the other variables (interest 
rates and output gap) can be explained within the model.
In this chapter, first I describe the model and this follows Meenagh et al (2009b); 
this model was developed in order to test theories of the persistence of UK inflation in dif­
ferent policy regimes over the post-war period. It was only applied to ARMA models of 
inflation for each of those regimes, effectively excluding the period I am dealing with here. 
Here I am using the general framework to test a full model of the economy. In contrast to 
Meenagh et al (2009b), I express all variables in term of per capita for simplicity. In sec­
tion 3 .1 ,1 derive the IS curve from the market clearing condition and Phillips curve from 
equations of production function, demand for labour and supply of labour, that are used to 
determine the path o f output gap and real interest rate. In the previous chapter inflation is 
determined by the fiscal equation. Output and interest rates are then determined by infla­
tion interacting with the IS curve and the Phillips curve. In section 3 .2 ,1 present the data
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and model calibration and briefly discuss the method used in analysis and testing. I test 
the model by creating my own Matlab code to bootstrap the model’s errors and generate 
95% confidence limits for a VAR representation of the data. To preserve the contempora­
neous correlation between the innovations I draw the bootstraps as a time vector and draw 
each period with replacement. I then input them into their error processes and these in turn 
into the model to solve for their implied path over the sample period. I then run V A R (  1) 
regressions of x t and rt on all the pseudo-samples to derive the implied 95% confidence 
intervals for all the coefficient values found. Finally I compare the V A R  coefficients esti­
mated from the actual data to see whether they lie within these 95% confidence intervals: 
under the null hypothesis these values represent the sampling variation for the V A R  co­
efficients which are generated by the model. The portmanteau Wald statistic - the 95% 
confidence limit for the joint distribution of the V A R  parameters - is also computed. The 
Wald statistic is derived from the bootstrap joint distribution of the V A R  parameters under 
the null hypothesis that the structural model holds. In the section 3.3 I report the results. 
The last section concludes.
3.1 The m odel
It is a medium-sized open economy and assumed that the real interest in UK economy has 
no real effect on the world interest rates (world interest rates are assumed to be exogenous) 
but allowing home interest rates to deviate from the world interest rates. To keep the rep­
resentation simple, I assume identical agent who produces a single good as output and use 
it for consumption and investment. There are no market imperfections such as transactions
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costs. There is no population growth and all variables are expressed as per capita (In this 
case all variables used in this chapter are expressed as per capita).
Each period the representative agent chooses the commodity bundle for consumption 
and leisure. During the period the necessary total amounts of factor inputs are also deter­
mined for production. In addition, goods do not enter in the production process hence they 
are only for trading purpose. The consumption comprises those consumption of domes­
tic goods C f  and consumption o f foreign goods C ( , or imports. I express the composite 
consumption utility function o f the form 1 2
where uj is the weight of home goods in the consumption function, a, the elasticity of 
substitution is equal to .
The general price level Pt also called the consumption-based price index is the mini­
mum expenditure that agent needs to acquire one unit of composite good Ct, provided the 
prices of home good and foreign good are as given. The resulting expression for the index 
is
where, P f  denotes the domestic price level, PtF denotes the foreign price level in domestic
(3.51)
Pt =  (P} ) ^  +  (1 -  { P t ) ^ p (3.52)
currency, P[  denotes the foreign price level in foreign currency and P f  = S tPtf  and S t is
the nominal exchange rate.
12 Armington (1969) CES aggregator.
3.1 The model 100
The corresponding expression for hom e goods demand in term of the composite con­
sumption is
C f  (  P f  \  1+p
C t \u iP t
And the corresponding expression for foreign goods demand in term of the composite 
consumption is
c {  f  p f  V1^
c t  =  ( ( T T t o f i )  <3'53>
The consumer maximises this com posite utility index, given that an amount Ct has 
been chosen for total expenditure/consumption, with respect to its components, C f and c {  
subject to Ct = pfCf + QtC[ 13 
Note that
1 =  0 ; *  ( p f ) ^  - b ( l - o ; ) * Q *  (3.54)
where Qt is defined as the foreign price level in domestic currency relative to the general 
price level (the real exchange rate and also the terms of trade).
Hence the resultant logarithmic approxim ation can be written as
{ 1  —  uj  1+/3logpdt =  -  ( ———  ) log (Qt) +  constant (3.55)
The Lagrangian problem can be formed as L u(ctyf + (i-w){c{y ( ? ) + y c t - % c ? -
^ C { ) .  Thus =  n\ also at its m axim um  w ith  the constraint binding L =  C t so that =  1.
Thus n  =  1 - the' change in the utility index from  a one unit rise in consumption is unity. Substitut­
ing this into the first order condition 0 =  y ie ld s  equation (3.53) . 0 =  gives the equiv­
alent equation: =  w * ( p f )  *  w here p f  =  Divide (3.51) through by C t to obtain 1 =
« ( £ ) - % ( ! - » ) { % )
gives equation (3.54).
( p ) cjf
substitu ting  in to  this for -gr-and -j^-from the previous two equations
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The representative agen t maximises his/her expected utility subject to the given bud­
get constraint. Each agen t’s preferences are given as
where (3 is the discount factor, Ct is real consumption in period t, N t is the labour sup­
ply 1  -Nt is the amount o f  leisure time consumed in period t and E 0 is the mathematical 
expectations operator.
The agent’s tastes are assumed to be constant over time and would not be influenced 
by any exogenous shocks in the economy. The utility function has the normal properties
1 ) it is increasing in space of consumption and leisure
DO
U  — M clxE q £  (Ct , 1  -  N t) (3.56)
t=o
u (C, 1  -  JV) > 0 (3.57)
2 ) it is concave
/ /
u (C, 1 -  JV) < 0 (3.58)
3) it satisfies Inada conditions
For consumption
u (C, 1 — iV) —> 0 as c — > oo (3.59)
and
u (C, 1 -  N) —> oo as c —► 0 (3.60)
For leisure
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The objective o f this chapter is to specify a fully articulated model of an open econ­
omy which is proposed to be calibrated/estimated using data for the UK. This model is used 
to explain the behaviour o f interest rates, output gap and inflation under FTPL environment.
3.1.1 The representative household
The model economy is assumed to have a large number of identical households who are 
making decisions on consumption, labour supply and investment interact in competitive 
market. Each household chooses sequence o f consumption and hours of leisure that max­
imise its expected discounted level of utility. The utility function is time-separable and has 
the following form
where 0  < 0 <  1 , and p1 > 0  is the leisure substitution parameter.
Each individual agent involve in a dynamic stochastic game where changes in expec­
tations about future events would generally affecting current decisions. Each household 
endowed with a fixed amount of time which is spent between leisure and work. The total 
endowment o f  time is normalised to unity implies that
Furthermore for convenience in the logarithmic transformations I assume that ap­
proximately L  — N  on average.
The representative agent’s budget constraint is
u ( C u 1  -  N t) =  Slog Ct +  ( 1  -  0) ( 1  -  f t ) " 1 ( 1  -  N tf ^ } (3.63)
Nt +  Lt — 1  or Lt — 1  -  Nt (3.64)
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where,
pt denotes the real present value of shares,
rt denotes labour income tax rate, which includes all taxes on households and is 
assumed to be a stochastic process, 
b{ denotes foreign bonds, 
bt denotes the domestic bonds,
Sf demand for domestic shares, 
dt denotes dividends,
Qt is the real exchange rate,
Qt =  ~  (3.66)
vt is the real consumer wage,
W t
vt = - t t  (3-67)
or
vt = wtPt (3.68)
where wt denotes the producer real wage. It is the wage relative to the domestic goods 
price level.
Note that only consumer real wages are linked with both domestic and foreign prices. 
Producers do not take into account the foreign prices as they do not use imported interme­
diate goods.
In a stochastic environment the representative agent maximizes the expected dis­
counted stream of utility subject to the budget constraint. The Lagrangian associated with
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this problem can be written as
OO
L =  max Eo 1 ^ 2 ^  (HogC, +  (1 -  B) ( 1  -  f t ) ” 1 ( 1  -  N tf ^
t= 0
+A( (1 -  r t) v ,N t + bt + Q tb{ + (pt + dt) S U  - C t -  -  t ^ 4 v  -  p ,S f
l  +  r t ( l  +  r /
where A is the Lagrangian multiplier. The conditions of expected behaviour of the 
economy and the time path o f the values of consumption, labour and investment both do­
mestic and foreign financial assets are listed below.
The first order conditions with respect to Ct, the marginal utility of consumption 
equals to the shadow price of output
With respect to N t, the marginal utility of leisure equals to marginal utility of labour 
which is the real wage net of income tax
With respect to b{+1, the expression for Uncovered Real Interest Rate Parity (URIP)
is
£ 0 7 ^ % -  =  £ 0 A1+i<3,+i (3.72)
(1 + H )
With respect to S?, the expression for the real present value of shares can be obtained
by
E o t f e c p 1 = E 0Xt (3.69)
E 0 (1 -  0) (1 -  N ty p 1 =  E 0Xt (1 -  T t )  vt (3.70)
With respect to bt+1 , the intratemporal consumption can be obtained by
(3.71)
EoXtpt  =  EoX t+i (p t+ i  +  dt+i) (3.73)
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Substituting equation (3.71) in (3.69) and letting t=0 yields
n  „ / ct v 1
Now substituting (3.69) and (3.71) in (3.70) yields
(1 - N t) =  Et { dCt (1(1_ ^ ‘)l,‘ } P1 (3-75)
Ct is the composite consumption level- it is the weighted average of domestic goods con­
sumption and foreign goods consumption (imported goods).
Substituting out for vt =  wtp f (the consumer real wage is the product of real producer 
wage and the domestic goods price), and noting that E t log vt = log vt 4-  log p \e =  log wt +  
logpf +  logPte, where the ue superscript means ‘unexpected’.
Using (3.55) equation (3.75) becomes 
(i AT, \  -  r t) exp [log wt -  ( ^ ) ^ ( l o g  Qt) +  log p™}} \  P 1
( i -  jvt) =  | ^ ---------------------------------- j  (3-76>
Substituting (3.71) in (3.73) yields
rp ( P t + 1  +  d t + i  \
= E ‘ ( t t t t t J  (3-77)
Using the arbitrage condition and forward substitution the expression for real present 
value per share equation (3.77) can be written as
OO ,
pt = E t — ------— -------- (3.78)
t r  n ; =1 ( i + n « )
This equation shows that the present value of shares is equal to the expected income 
stream from the dividend payment.
It is argued that UK should be considered as a medium sized economy for which 
the domestic economy is small enough to continue with the assumption that world interest
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rates are exogenous (in small open economy models the domestic real interest rate is taken 
as given which is equal to the world interest rate) but large enough for the domestic rate to 
deviate from the world rate (Meenagh et al, 2010).
To derive the uncovered interest parity condition by substituting the representative 
agent’s demand for home goods (equation (3.71)) into the household’s Lagrangian (equa­
tion (3.72)) yields
3.1.2 The government
The government must finance its exogenously amount of expenditure Gt (expressed in per 
capita) by levying a labour income tax r t and by issuing bonds bt, each period which pays 
a return next period. It is assumed that government spends less than the national income, 
where the output is always at its ’desired’ level in equilibrium.
The government budget constraint is
(3.79)
In logs this yields
(3.80)
Gt +  bt — r tvtNt  +  - -
1  + rt
(3.81)
where bt is real bonds.
3.1.3 The representative firm with fixed capital
Firms rent labour from households, who own their shares, and transform them into output 
according to a production technology and sell consumption goods to households and gov-
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emment. The technology available to the economy is described by following production 
function where capital is fixed
where,
0 < a < 1,
Yt is aggregate output per capita,
Z t reflects the state of technology.
In a stochastic environment the firm maximises present discounted stream, V, of cash 
flows, subject to the production technology
Yt = Z tN ta (3.82)
T
M a x V  =  E t dl (Yt+i -  wt+iN t+i) (3.83)
Here wt is the producer real wage. The firm optimally chooses labour so that
(3.84)
3.1.4 The foreign sector
Recall that the household’s consumption bundle is
Ct = pdt C f + Q tC l (3.85)
where
(3.86)
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The Lagrangian problem can be formalised as
L =
o
max E 0 i E *9  
+p, (pfC ? +  Q tC{ -  C t)
e \ o g c t + (i -  e) (i -  Ply l (i -  Nt){1~Pi)
( 1  — rf) vtN t Jr b t + Qtb{ +  (pt +  dt) <S'f_ 1 — Ct — —t+1
1  +  r t Q , 6 ' + 1  - r s t( l  +  r / )
The first order condition with respect to C f  is
With respect to C f  is
u>(ctyp + { 1- oj) -p = »tPt
-p(l-oo) ( c l oo (Cf) + (1 -oo) (cl)
Combine equations (3.87) and (3.88) yields
(?->)
VtQt
(3.87)
(3.88)
( g i y +p = q 1
Cl) Vt
or
The elasticity between domestic and foreign goods is
a  —
1olo1 i 1 1
K * ) J U f ) J l+p
(3.89)
(3.90)
(3.91)
where a is assumed to be a non-negative number and will take the finite value.
The amount o f imports will be the consumption of foreign good C {. Hence the 
import equation for UK can be written as
log C{ = cr log +  lo§ Ct ~ a log Q t +  °  logp f (3.92)
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Recall that the demand for home goods is a function of total composite consumption
^  =  w ‘+ -(p “) 1 + 0  (3.93)
Taking logs of the domestic good consumption equation yields
log C f  =  a  log cu +  log Ct - a  log p f ( 3 .9 4 )
Substituting (3.94) into the equation (3.92) to give the import function
log c { =  log IM, = a  log (1 -  w) +  log Ct -  a log Qt (3.95)
Similarly for the foreign country, the corresponding Armington aggregator consump­
tion function can be written as
C f =
■J . y p f
u f l C n  + ( 1  - W> )
(?)
(3.96)
and
p*  =  +  (1 - a / ) ^ 7  (PtD) ^  (3.97)
and
0 K ^ ) ( $ )  P p f  (3'98)
where C f  is the composite consumption o f the foreign country, C{d is the consumption of 
its own goods in foreign country and C {f  is the consumption of domestic goods in foreign 
country. is the weight o f foreign goods in the consumption function and Q{ is the real 
exchange rate in term of foreign aggregate price and Q{ = Ptfd is the foreign price 
in foreign currency (i.e. the foreign country’s own price level) and PtD corresponds to
j-v 4
the domestic price level in foreign currency, i.e. Pt =  denotes the elasticity of
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substitution between its own goods (foreign country’s production goods) and home goods 
(home exports).
The corresponding expression for foreign country’s home goods demand in term of 
the composite consumption is
=  - W -  (3.99)
Taking logs of the foreign country’s own goods consumption equation (3.99)
log C [d — <7^ log (u /) +  log C.f  — a* logp{d (3.100)
Taking logs of equation (3.98)
log C{f  — a f  log ^ +  loS C {d + a f  log Qt +  a f  logp{d (3.101)
where Q{ =
Substituting equation (3.100) into equation (3.101) yields
log C {f  =  log E X t = crf  log ( l  -  u f ) + log C [  +  a f  log Qt (3.102)
Finally, the foreign bonds evolve over time according to the foreign bond holding and 
the difference between the imports and exports
Q,bH -  =  QtH + Vdt E X t -  QtIM t (3.103)
(1 + r{)
3.1.5 Behavioural equations
The complete listings of model’s behavioural equations are
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(1) The composite Consumption Ct which is the weighted average of UK domestic 
goods and foreign goods consumption
(?)
c, = LJ ( C ? ) - ' +  ( l - a O
~ P
Given the consumption Ct solves for rt
( 1  +  rt) -  ± E t ( g -
- 1
(3.104)
(3.105)
or
C t  —  £ C t + i  —  $r t  4 - £qt (3.106)
Using a first order Taylor series expansion around (average) Ct , E tCt+i, where £ =
(iTc 7 ) an<^  ^  =  and it would be typically assumed to be less than unity on the
grounds of growth. By dividing both sides by Ct, I can approximate this linear expression
as
log Ct =  £Et log Ct+i -  £t3rt +  £U (3.107)
(2) UIP condition
rt =  r{ +  E t log Qt+i -  log Qt +  £2t (3.108)
where r f  denotes the foreign real interest rate
(3) Production function Yt
Yt = Z t (N t)a (3.109)
or
log Yt = at log N t +  log Z t (3.110)
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(4) Demand for labour
ivt = ( ^ )  (3.111)
or
log N t =  log a  +  log Yt -  log wt (3.112)
(5) The producer wage is derived by equating demand for labour, N t, to the supply 
of labour given by the consumer’s first order conditions
- i
pij ,r j  I e c t 1 [ ( !  -  T t )  exp (logu>, -  ( ^ ) g(logQ,) +  lo g p f)]  I (3113)
or
log(l-iV t) =  -  log TV* =  —
Pi
log Ct -  log(l -  T t ) -  log wt -  \ogput e +  (-— - ) a log Qt
UJ
+  e 3t
where Qt is the domestic real exchange rate, ( 1  — uj)a is the weight of domestic prices in 
the CPI index.
(6 ) Imports IM t
log I M t =  cr log (1 -  u j )  +  log Ct -  cr log Qt (3.114)
(7) Exports E X t
lo g E X t  =  cr-^log ( l -  w f ) +  lo g C f +  <1 ^ log Qt (3.115)
(8 ) Market-clearing condition for goods
Yt = Ct + Gt + E X t -  I M t (3.116)
(9) Balance of payment (give the accumulation of foreign bonds)
, t+1„  = Q t b { +  Pdt E X t -  QtIM t (3.117)
(i  +  n )
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(10) The present value o f shares
(3.118)
which is given by the expected income stream from dividend payments.
(11) The value o f dividends
d tS f  = Yt -  wtN t (3.119)
(12) Nominal exchange rate
(3.120)
and the government expenditure share is assumed to be an exogenous process.
3.1.6 The resulting small models 
The IS curve:
To derive the IS curve note that loglinearising the market-clearing condition directly
yields
where c is the share of consumption in GDP, x  is the share of trade in GDP and a  * =  cr+cr^. 
Hence substituting for log Ct from above yields
log =  clog Ct + gt + z(log C f  -  log Ct) +  xa* log Qt (3.121)
log Yt =  j C_  ^ = T rt + 9t + x C [  +  xa* log Qt (3.122)
and multiplying through by 1  — 1  gives
log Yt =  -€ /3rt +  £E t log Yt+i +  x N X t +  vt (3.123)
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This is the IS curve where N X t = (1 -  £B -1) lo g C f +  cr*(l -  £ £ _1) log Qt (the 
external factors driving net exports) and vt =  (1 -  Denote wt =  +  vt the
composite error term in this IS curve so that
log Yt = -€ f i r t + £E t log Yt+1  +  wt (3.124)
The New Classical Phillips Curve:
The New Classical Phillips Curve can be obtained as follows. I solve the 3 equations 
production function- equation (3.110), demand for labour - equation (3.112), and supply 
of labour - equation (3.113), first for expected (equilibrium) values, assuming log Ct is also 
at its expected value. Then I solve the same three equations for the effect o f unexpected 
prices, logp^e (consumption is assumed to be smoothed to stay at its expected value). The 
production function implies that log Ytue =  a  log N™e hence the demand for labour can 
be written as log N ^ e =  — yz^ l°g  w™6. Finally the labour supply equation implies that 
logA^e =  ^-(logu^e +  logp^e) so it follows that logWte =  logp^e. The labour
supply equation implies that log w?e =  Pl~ ~  (logPte) so that log Ytue =  - - ^ ^ (logjff6). 
This is of course the ’surprise’ Phillips Curve
log Yt =  logy* +  6{\ogpt -  E t- !  logPt) (3.125)
where 5 =  — ^—  and it has been assumed that households do not have contemporaneousp i +  l —a
knowledge of the general price level.
3.1.7 The completed model
Now the complete the DSGE model can be written as
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Rewrite the IS curve
( V t  — V t )  =  ~ (P(rt — r*) +  £Et(yt+i — y*+i) +  wt (3.126)
where, 0 =  £0 (c — x )
the New Classical Phillips Curve (NCPC)
x t — — Et-iiTt) +  Ut (3.127)
Since inflation follows a random walk by assumption (so that expected inflation is 
simply lagged inflation), I can now establish from these two equations that 
IS curve
^  =  -  ut) 4- \ w t -  ^-EtUt+i (3.128)0 0 0
and New Classical Phillips Curve (NCPC ) 1 4
x t =  6A7rt +  ut (3.129)
Thus output and real interest rates are stationary processes around their natural rates.
Both ut and wt may be serially correlated.
Inflation follows a random walk from the FTPL solution (so that expected inflation is 
simply lagged inflation)
A 7 T* =  AC x (Agt -  A t t) +  T)t (3.130)
where k — is 7r, r*, t and g are mean values of the corresponding variables. And
rjt is the structural error which captures the other effects on the process of A 7rt .
14 I only consider the N ew  Classical Phillips Curve (NCPC) as price/inflation is required to ensure the 
balance o f  government intertemporal budget constraint. Inflation moves because o f  consumer spend bond 
income (the excess demand). The case o f  implicit price/inflation rigidity is not modeled here.
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3.2 Data, calibration and testing
I begin with some notes on the time-series behaviour of the inflation and the other macro 
variables I am dealing with for this period (1970q4-1978q4) - Figure 3.11. All data is 
extracted from UK Office of National Statistic (ONS) data bank. Recall that the data for 
inflation is defined as the Consumer Price Level (CPI) deflator, N7 " a'To[a' Consumptl°;JTNrTC). The
v '  7 R e a l  T otal C o n su m p tio n  (R T C )
mean and standard deviation for the sample period (quarterly rates of change, in fraction 
per quarter) are 3% and 1% respectively. The real interest rates are the difference between 
the nominal interest rates and inflation. Output gap (xt) and net real interest rate (rt) are 
detrended from their long run equilibrium level using H-P filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 
1997). Inflation is 1(1), both x t and rt are stationary processes - confirmed by ADF and PP 
tests - Table 3.27.
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Inflation Outputgap Net real interest rate
1977 1978 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977  19781978
Fig. 3.11. Patterns of macro variables (1970Q4-1978Q4)
Unit Root Tests 7r< Xt r t
Levels Is* Diff. Levels I s* Diff. Levels 1st Diff.
ADF Test Statistic -2.107 ^ 2 l 8  =2J65 - ^T049 =
(0.243) (0.000)** (0.031)* - (0.004)**
PP Test Statistic -2.127 -7.561 -2.322 - -2.173
  (0.236) (0.000)** (0.022)* - (0.031)*
Table 3.27. Tests for non-stationarity o f inflation, output gap and net real interest rates
Notes on Table: MacKinnon’s critical values (MacKinnon, 1996) fo r  rejection o f  hy­
pothesis o f a unit root: values in parentheses are p-values, while * ** indicate significance 
at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. Number o f  lags in the ADF test is set upon A IC  cri­
terion and PP test upon Newey-West bandwidth (see Newey and West, 1987).
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The calibration is taken from Meenagh et al (2010) and the completed lists of the 
model parameter are presented in Table 3.28.
Parameter Calibrated Value
0 0.99
t 1.0
Pi 1.0
a 0.7
c 0.7
X 0.3
<t> =  € 0 ( c - x ) 0.4
 ^ ~~ P, + l - a 0.5
Table 3.28. Calibrated parameters
Time discount rate (3 is set to 0.99 implying an approximate 1% quarterly rate of 
interest. £ which is defined as (;gf§ ~ )  is expected equals to one in the New Classical 
framework. The substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure pl is unity, a — 
0.70 impiles production is labour intensive, c and x  are the consumption and trade share in 
GDP respectively.
3.2.1 Bootstrapping and the method of indirect inference
Note that in this model inflation is recursively determined by A g , A t t , rjt; and I have al­
ready tested the model for its ability to replicate inflation behaviour in the previous chapter. 
Even though rjt could well be correlated with other model errors, these other errors cannot 
detennine inflation conditional on gt being chosen. Thus when I draw the vector of error 
innovations for the model the other ones can be discarded as they are o f no impact on in­
flation. It follows that I have already tested the inflation model above and what remains is 
to test the other part of the model for x t and rt .
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I replicate the stochastic environment to see whether the estimated dynamic equations 
could have been generated by this model. This I do by bootstrapping the model above with 
their error processes and focus on its solution for these two variables alone. The detailed 
testing procedure is explained in previous chapter (section 2.6). This method (indirect 
inference) uses an ‘auxiliary model’ - in this case is a V A R  - to describe the data and 
to evaluate the fit o f a given structural model (rather than for estimation). The auxiliary 
model used is a V A R {\). By raising the lag order of the V A R  and increasing the number 
of variables, the stringency o f the overall test of the model is increased. If the structural 
model is already rejected by a V A R {  1) then I do not proceed to a more stringent test based 
on a higher order V A R .  Le et al (2001) illustrate a case for higher order VARs. By raising 
the lag order of the VAR in their model setup it worsens the fit to the data because greater 
complexity in the behaviour being captured. Thus having rejected the model VAR(l), I 
would reject any case for VAR(i) on i>  1, whatever order was needed to get the ’best’ VAR 
fit. The issue of misspecification of a VAR model is not relevant to the test I use here.
Output gap and net real interest rates are determined by inflation interacting with the 
IS curve and the Phillips curve. To preserve the contemporaneous correlation between the 
innovations I draw the bootstraps as a time vector and each time with a replacement. I 
then input them into their error processes and these in turn into the model to solve for their 
implied path over the sample period. I then run V A R (  1) regressions of x t and rt on all 
the pseudo-samples to derive the implied 95% confidence intervals for all the coefficient 
values found. Finally I compare the V A R  coefficients estimated from the actual data to 
see whether they lie within these 95% confidence intervals: under the null hypothesis these
3.3 Testing results 120
values represent the sampling variation for the V A R  coefficients which are generated by the 
model. The portmanteau Wald statistic - the 95% confidence limit for the joint distribution 
of the V  A R  parameters - is also computed. The Wald statistic is derived from the bootstrap 
joint distribution of the V  A R  parameters under the null hypothesis that the structural model 
holds.
In addition to the Wald percentile, the Mahalanobis Distance is generally calculated 
to measure the extent to which the model fits poorly. It is computed based on the same 
joint distribution, normalised as a ^-statistic, as an overall measure of closeness between 
the model and the data. In effect, this covey the same information as in the Wald test but 
is in the form of a t-value. The Mahalanobis Distance is the square root of the Wald value, 
defined as
x l  0 4 5  (3.131)
^/2W c - \ / 2 n
where, M a is the Mahalanobis distance calculated using the actual data, M c is the 
critical Mahalanobis distance based on the simulated data at 95% confidence interval, n  is 
the degree of freedom (i.e. the number of parameters considered within the model). One 
could convert the chi-squared distribution into a standard f-statistic by adjusting the mean 
and the size. I normalise this here by ensuring that the resulting ^-statistic is 1.645 at the 
95% point of the distribution.
3.3 T estin g  resu lts
I now use the equation for FTPL, the IS curve and the Philips curve and bootstrap the 
random components of these wt and ut processes and use the pre-determined samples of
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inflation. I obtain 1000 pseudo-samples of x t and rt then run an V^4.R(1) on each of these 
samples to generate the distribution of the V  A R {\)  parameters. The Wald statistic then 
tests the model at the 95% level o f confidence on the basis of the complete set of V A R {  1) 
parameters. The auxiliary V A R  model is assumed to have the following form
Xt ' P n (31 2 Xt - l + Qit_ n  _ P2 1 $22 . rt~l . @2t
where, all (3 s are the coefficients to be tested. Table 3.29 lists the results of this 
exercise. The model as a whole captured by the full wald statistic of 100% implies that the 
model is rejected and cannot replicate the full property of the actual data. Dynamically, two 
out of four V A R (1) estimates lie outside the 95% bounds implied by the model, including 
the output gap response to its own lag (J3n ) and the rt response to the lag of output gap 
(J32 1 ). Both estimates are far from the bounds, the model generates an even larger dynamic 
for rt response to the lag of output gap with a lower bound o f 1.08 and upper bound of 3.10 
.This makes it highly probable that the model will be rejected overall, since I would only 
expect 5% of the parameters to be rejected under overall acceptance. The Mahalanobis 
Distance is calculated to give an idea how bad the model can be where f-statistic of 1.645 
corresponds to the 95% confidence interval. The large number of the transformed distance 
(i.e. 5.11) indicates the model overall performance is quite bad. In addition, the model 
cannot capture the joint distribution of the actual data volatility at 95% confidence interval 
as well as 99%.
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V A R {  1) Estimated 95% Confidence interval IN/OUT
coefficient Lower Upper
0 n 0.800 -0.671 0.3699 OUT
012 0.019 -0.285 0.185 IN
021 0.586 1.085 3.105 OUT
022 0.560 0.364 1.224 IN
V  a r ( x t ) 0.000355 0.000340 0.001067 IN
V a r ( r t ) 0.000103 0.001897 0.006035 OUT
Transformed m-dis
Wald statistic (Dynam ics) 99.9% 4.333
Wald statistic (Volatility) 99.2% 3.308
Full wald statistic 100% 5.119
Table 3.29. Confidence limits for theoretical VAR(l)
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have extended the empirical tests of the model for the 1970s episode to 
the data for the output gap and interest rates. What I find is that while the model was 
accepted for inflation, which is recursively prior determined, it is rejected for these other 
two variables. With a normalised Mahalanobis Distance of 5.1 overall and 3.3 for the data 
variances, this rejection is not so catastrophic that some re-specification could not possibly 
repair the model. But, perhaps not surprisingly, it indicates that the rather simple set-up 
of the model, while well able to capture the wide fluctuations of inflation in this unusual 
policy environment, cannot capture the behaviour of output and interest rates.
Overall Conclusions
This thesis aims to make a contribution to the study of the UK economy in two main 
ways. First, I test the hypothesis o f sustainability for the UK’s public finances. A dis­
tinct feature of my analysis compared to previous studies is that I test for fiscal policy 
sustainability accounting simultaneously for endogenously identified structural breaks and 
non-linearities in UK fiscal policy. The main findings are as follows. First, UK fiscal pol­
icy has been sustainable over the period under examination, 1955-2006. Second UK fiscal 
policy has been subject to three multiple breaks, respectively occurring in the early 1970s, 
early 1980s and late 1990s. The first break moved the UK away from fiscal sustainabil­
ity. Indeed, I find that during the period 1973-1980 UK fiscal policy was non-Ricardian. 
The remaining two breaks contributed towards the restoration of sustainable fiscal dynam­
ics. Finally, I find that UK fiscal policy adjusts non-linearly towards long-run equilibrium. 
More specifically, the nonlinear analysis of fiscal adjustment shows that UK authorities 
react more vigorously when the fiscal deficit crosses certain thresholds.
The finding that the 1970s were characterized by non-Ricardian fiscal regime mo­
tivates the second part of the analysis. In such a regime, characterized by ’active’ fiscal 
policy and ’passive’ monetary policy (Leeper, 1991), fiscal equilibrium is assumed to be 
restored by price changes as suggested by the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (Wood­
ford, 1995). First, it assumes that money is entirely accommodating; thus it is produced 
as needed to equal the demand for money resulting from the behaviour of output, inflation 
and interest rates. For the money supply, I note that the demand for money function will
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hold at all times with an error term. I then can check on the causal direction of lagged ef­
fects thus given a disequilibrium in the demand for money, I can ask whether it affects the 
money growth rate today (which is thus endogenously adapting to money demand). I find 
money is endogenous.
Second, it assumes that government spending and taxation are set in a non-Ricardian 
way, that is they do not respond to the state of the public finances in a way that would 
restore fiscal balance. They can respond to other factors, such as unemployment or special 
interests but are independent of the finances. For the fiscal variables, I look for a lagged 
response to indicators of fiscal imbalance. I find a non-Ricardian fiscal policy regime as 
no feedback from changes in the debt onto the primary surplus. I then use a bootstrap 
method, developed by Meenagh et al (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) to test the model according 
to their dynamic performance. While for its trend I use cointegration analysis (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). I find that FTPL provides a reasonable explanation for inflation in the UK 
1970s. Nevertheless, when the model is extended to the data output gap and interest rates 
the model is 1 0 0 % rejected.
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